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More than ten years after the deployment of the first African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
troops to Mogadishu, it is imperative that an in-depth analysis is conducted to examine whether the 
troops have reduced the threat of al-Shabaab in Somalia and the region. This analysis is especially 
important since AMSIOM is the latest attempt to create a stable and strong central government in 
Somalia since the fall of Said Barre’s regime in 1991. The extremist group, al-Shabaab, has evolved to 
become the strongest opponent and obstacle to the creation of the Federal Government of Somalia. The 
main objective of this dissertation is to challenge the definition of success advocated by AMISOM and 
its allies regarding their progress in Somalia. This study also aims to analyse the effectiveness of the 
counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations employed by AMISOM to reduce the 
threat of al-Shabaab. To analyse the effectiveness of the CT and COIN operations utilised between 2007 
and 2016, this paper will contextualise the body-count approach using data collected from African 
Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) reports and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by the 
University of Maryland. This study concludes that the weak mandate, which prevented the troops from 
conducting military offensives, and inadequate troop strength during the first phase of the mission 
(2007-July 2010), provided al-Shabaab with the right environment to evolve from a terrorist group into 
an insurgency by securing their support both their domestic and international support. Also, AMISOM’s 
failure to change their tactics and strategy to account for modifications adapted by al-Shabaab during 
the second and third phases (July 2010 – May 2012 and June 2012 – December 2016) has contributed 
to their limited success in Somalia. Although the scope of this study does not discuss all possible reasons 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1: Introduction 
On 19th January 2007, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Union (AU) organ 
responsible for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the continent,1  announced 
the deployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping troops to Somalia’s 
capital city of Mogadishu. A month later, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved 
the six-month peace support mission mandated to:“(i) provide support to the Transitional Federal 
Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the 
furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, (ii) facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and 
(iii) create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in 
Somalia.”2 The primary objective of this mission is to reduce the threat of insurgent and terrorist groups 
in the country.  Thus, when al-Shabaab became the most dominant group in Somalia, they became the 
key target of AMISOM's counterterrorism (CT)  and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.3   
Following the change of mandate in 2010, AMISOM’s approach to minimising the threat of al-
Shabaab has remained unchanged. The focus of the COIN operations became the “liberation of cities 
and towns” from al-Shabaab. Decapitation became the cornerstone of AMISOM’s counterterrorism 
strategy, with the support of the United States (US) military, as part of United States Africa Command 
(AFRICOM). These operations are designed to kill or capture of top al-Shabaab leaders.  To ensure that 
they reduced al-Shabaab's ability to conduct attacks both in Somalia and in the region, AMISOM’s 
strategy has focused on increasing the number of CT and COIN operations and the troop strength.   
AMISOM officials, Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and donor countries continue to 
praise AMISOM’s successes in Somalia. AMISOM claimed that COIN and CT operations conducted 
between January 2007 and December 20164 resulted in momentous victories in Somalia. The coalition 
forces maintain that COIN operations have “liberated” major cities such as Baraawe, Mogadishu, 
Kismayo and Beledweyne. Additionally, the deaths of top leaders such as Aden Hashi Ayro, and Ahmed 
                                                          
     1 ‘Peace and Security Council (PSC)’, African Union, accessed 19 September 2016, 
http://www.au.int/en/organs/psc. 
     2 ‘Report of the Peace and Security Council on Its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa’ 
(Addis Ababa: Assembly of the African Union, 29 January 2007). Article 53 and 54 of Chapter VIII of the 
United Nations Charter requires regional institutions to seek authorization from the UNSC. ‘Article 53 and 54, 
Charter of the United Nations (UNTS XVI)’ (United Nations, 24 October 1945), 54, 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-viii/. 
     3 Al-Shabaab is classified as a terrorist organisation by the AU.  
     4 This dissertation will focus on this specific time frame, although the mission is currently ongoing, because 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the database I am using, released data until December 31st, 2016.  
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Abdi Godane,5 Mr Adan Garar,6 Jama Deere and Ismael Jamhad7 as a result of CT operations have dealt 
significant blows to al-Shabaab. Also, the pressure from AMISOM has pushed al-Shabaab top officials 
such as Ali Hassan Gheddi and Mohamed Faruq to defect to AMISOM and Somali Armed Forces (SAF) 
troops.8         
Although the reports and communiques from the AU and UN do not specifically indicate how 
the institutions measure the successes mentioned above, the official documents suggest that AMISOM 
uses the body-count approach to evaluate the progress of their counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
operations. This method calls for the statistical analysis of CT indicators (number of incidents and 
casualties suffered, plots foiled, destruction of safe havens and training camps, leaders and members 
killed or arrested, disruption of recruitment flow or the amount of terrorist funding seised) and COIN 
indicators (territorial gains). The scholars and institutions that use the body-count approach conclude 
that the increase or decrease of the factors mentioned above indicate the success or failure of such 
operations.9 The use of the body-count approach can be seen by the constant praise of the “liberation of 
cities and towns” from al-Shabaab and the death and defection of top leaders as a result of CT and 
COIN operations. In AMISOM’s view, the “liberation of cities and towns” not only diminishes the 
threat of al-Shabaab but also spreads the authority of the Transitional Federal Government’s (TFG), 
which later became the Federal Government of Somalia (FSG) in 2012, throughout Somalia. The 
Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia, Ambassador 
Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, shared these sentiments when he spoke of the AMISOM’s gains in 
Mogadishu in 2011.10 In one instance, UN Monitoring group claimed that the death of al-Shabaab leader 
                                                          
     5 Aden Ayro and Godane, the first and second Emir (leader) of al-Shabaab, were killed by US airstrikes in 
2008 and 2014 respectively.  Bill Roggio and Zackary Elkaim, ‘Weekend Attacks in Somalia Deal Shabaab a 
Double Blow’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 26 January 2014, 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/weekend_attacks_in_s.php; Eric Schmitt, Jeffrey Gettleman, 
and Hellene Cooper, ‘Strikes Killed Militant Chief in Somalia, U.S. Reports’, The New York Times, 5 
September 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/world/africa/somalia-shabab.html. 
    6 Mr. Garar is suspected architect of the Westgate attacks in Nairobi, Kenya. ‘Four Die as Governor Convoy 
Is Ambushed’, Daily Nation, 13 March 2014, http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Al-Shabaab-Adan-Garar-Strike-
US-Army/-/1056/2652674/-/s72mof/-/index.html. 
    7 Jama Deere and Ismael Jamhad are suspected commanders who executed the Garissa University attack in 
Kenya. Samwel Maina, ‘US Drone Attack in Somalia Takes out Al-Shabaab Leaders’, Euronews, 17 July 2015, 
sec. World News, http://www.euronews.com/2015/07/17/drone-attack-kills-al-shabaab-leaders/. 
     8 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia Dated 8 January 2010’ (New York: United 
Nations Security Council, 8 January 2010), 1. 
     9 Daniel Byman, ‘Scoring the War on Terrorism’, The National Interest, no. 72 (2003): 75–84; Nadav 
Morag, ‘Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, 
no. 4 (2005): 307–20; Solomon, Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgencies from Al-
Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram; Cronin, ‘U.S. Grand Strategy and Counterterrorism’. 
     10 ‘AU Special Representative Praises Peacekeepers for Recent Gains in Somalia’, Press Release 
(Mogadishu: AMISOM, 21 September 2011), http://amisom-au.org/2011/09/au-special-representative-praises-
peacekeepers-for-recent-gains-in-somalia/. 
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Godane in 2014 “represents a significant achievement for AMISOM and the Federal Government in 
their efforts to defeat Al-Shabaab” and have “in general resulted in short-term gains.”11  
Ten years since the deployment of troops to Mogadishu, it is essential to question the validity 
of the repeated claims by AMISOM and their allies. It is essential to evaluate AMISOM’s progress in 
reducing al-Shabaab’s threat in Somalia and the region. This dissertation argues the picture painted by 
UN and AU documents, using the body-count approach, does not accurately reflect the reality on the 
ground regarding the diminished threat of al-Shabaab in Somalia. The minimal progress of AMISOM 
is heavily influenced by the inability of the coalition forces to adapt to the ever-changing conflict 
environment.  Firstly, the classification of AMISOM as a peace-support mission, which did not allow 
the troops to engage militarily with militants like al-Shabaab unless in self-defence, and the inadequate 
troop strength during the first phase (2007 to 10 July 2010) proved to beneficial to al-Shabab. Without 
military operations, the militant group had the freedom to rebrand themselves into an independent 
organisation, solidify their support base and create structures that have proved to be advantageous to 
the progress of their cause. Secondly, the claimed success of the “liberation” of Mogadishu in 2011 
during the second phase (11 July 2010 to May 2012) secured the pathway to over-militarisation of the 
COIN and CT operations henceforth. This study argues that the “liberation of Mogadishu” exemplified 
to AMISOM that their new strategy that called for an increase in the number of CT and COIN 
operations, as a result of a mandate change, and additional battalions and the rehatting of TCC troops 
will ultimately lead to the reduction of al-Shabaab’s threat in Somalia and the region.  The military 
pressure during the second phase forced al-Shabaab to make tactical changes such as relinquishing their 
territorial control of Mogadishu and other towns when directly confronted by AMISOM troops. Instead, 
the group waged a guerrilla war in which they intensified their use of terrorism in those so-called 
liberated cities and towns. Additionally, the militant group forged alliances with like-minded groups 
such as al-Hijra and al-Qaida to attract new members, foot-soldiers and sympathisers who would 
provide additional active and passive support. Thirdly, AMISOM’s decision not to change its tactics 
and strategy to accommodate the changes made by al-Shabaab during the third phase (June 2012 – 
December 2016) has contributed to AMISOM’s slow progress. This study maintains that the analysis 
of the third phase shows that an increased number of CT and COIN operations and additional troop 
strength does not equate to the reduction of al-Shabaab’s threat. Al-Shabaab has not only demonstrated 
its ability to orchestrate sophisticated attacks but also their resilience to the CT and COIN operations. 
Additionally, the use of terrorism to cause fear and chaos puts a significant hole to AMISOM’s 
assumption that clearing of insurgent activities or “liberation of cities and towns” is enough to claim 
success. For “Clear, Hold and Build” counterinsurgency operations to be deemed successful, AMIOSM 
must provide at least minimum security. Although AMISOM has not significantly decreased the threat 
                                                          
     11 ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2111 
(2013): Somalia’ (New York: United Nations Security Council, 13 October 2013), 15. 
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of al-Shabaab, the CT and COIN operations have negatively impacted the militant group. At the end of 
the second and third phases, reports regarding infighting among the top echelon surfaced. Although it 
is unclear the direct impact of the infighting on the strength of the group, it is a sign of weakness. 
 
1.2: Research question  
Since the fall of the President Barre’s regime in 1991, each attempt to create a federal 
government was met with strong internal and external opposition, as well as spoilers determined to 
prolong the conflict. The constant pressure from clans, sub-clans, warlords, militant groups resulted in 
the creation of weak institutions that were easily toppled by militias and other non-state actors such as 
al-Shabaab. After many negotiations, conferences and transitional governments spanning twenty-five 
years, it is paramount to analyse the latest effort, AMISOM, to restore stability in Somalia. More 
specifically, this study aims to answer the questions: 1) Does the current standard of measuring the 
success of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations used by AMISOM provide a full picture 
of the progress of the mission ten years after its inception? 2) How effective have the COIN and CT 
operations employed by AMISOM been in reducing the threat of al-Shabaab?   
 
1.3: Justification for this thesis  
This study hopes to build on existing research about the analysis and evaluation of 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies, which is increasingly becoming important as groups 
such as al-Shabaab and Boko Haram become prominent international actors. There is a dearth of 
context-specific literature on CT and COIN policies in Somalia. Regarding Somalia, the existing 
knowledge discusses the history of the Somalia and al-Shabaab and the various negotiations that have 
taken place in the last twenty-five years. In some cases, some authors have discussed the CT and COIN 
strategies used by AMISOM, but not many scholars have evaluated the efforts to reduce the threat al-
Shabaab. Also, many of the works in this field have not discussed the possible factors that have 
contributed to either the success or failure of the mission. Without an in-depth analysis, it becomes 
difficult to determine what is working and what needs to be changed to accommodate the evolving 
reality of the conflict.  
This dissertation is also essential in the context of regional security and stability. The inability 
to establish a stable FSG has a detrimental effect on the region, particularly since al-Shabaab is 
conducting frequent attacks in Somalia and neighbouring countries. As long as there is conflict in 
Somalia, its neighbours will continue to interfere with Somali affairs under the pretence of national 
security.  More Somalis will flee to neighbouring countries if the status quo remains unchanged in 
Somalia. As we have seen in other parts of the continent, mass migration of refugees can destabilise 
host countries. In the case of Kenya, the increase of refugees conjoined with fear that al-Shabaab is 
using Dadaab refugee camp as a haven has caused the government to consider closing the largest 
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refugee camp in the world.12 Overall, the evaluation of the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
strategies employed by AMISOM will be beneficial for regional security and stability.      
 
1.4: Research methodology  
This dissertation uses both qualitative and quantitative data to assess the progress of 
AMISOM’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies to counter the threat of al-Shabaab. 
Since AU and UN support the mission, their respective institutions, PSC and the UNSC, publish reports. 
These documents detail the perceived successes and challenges faced by AMISOM, as well as details 
of some of the attacks and critical information about al-Shabaab. Unfortunately, both institutions do not 
regularly publish data on the number of attacks and casualties, especially when it comes to data 
regarding AMISOM and Somali Armed Forces (SAF) casualties. For this reason, this dissertation 
utilises the data gathered by the University of Maryland’s database, Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
As one of the best terrorism-related databases, it will provide information about al-Shabaab attacks and 
casualties. Existing research from books, scholarly articles and newspapers will also supplement the 
report prepared by the AU and UN, especially about terrorism, insurgency, COIN and CT operations.     
 
1.5: Research limitations  
The instability in Somalia lessens the likelihood of conducting independent field research. For 
this reason, this dissertation will face several limitations.  The inability to administer independent 
research means that this thesis must rely on databases such as GTD which means that this dissertation 
must anticipate the possibility of human error, i.e. writing the inaccurate information. Furthermore, due 
to the volatile atmosphere in Somalia, it is difficult to gather complete information. Therefore, some of 
the categories in the database are missing vital information. From an analysis of the raw data, most of 
the missing information involves the number of attacks and casualties of AMISOM and SAF troops. 
The fact that the Somali government, AMISOM nor the TCCs frequently publish such information 
contributes to the problem of accuracy of data. Moreover, during the initial years of al-Shabaab (2007-
2008), it was difficult to verify which attacks were conducted by the group since they did not claim 
responsibility for many attacks. Despite these challenges, GTD is considered one of the best terrorism 
databases. To verify the accuracy of information provided by the database, newspapers and other 
scholarly works will be used to cross-check the data. Another major limitation is the reliance on PSC 
and UNSC documents since they contain biases, i.e. what information to include or exclude in the 
documents. These reports tend to exaggerate the extent to which AMISOM’s objectives have been met 
and the impact of their operations on reducing the threat of al-Shabaab. Despite these limitations, the 
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information provided by the official documents and the GTD, as well as newspapers and scholarly 
articles, will sufficiently offer a clearer image of the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies 
used in Somalia.   
 
1.6: Chapters overview 
Following the introductory chapter, the paper will progress to the literature review. This second 
chapter will discuss the ambiguities related to the fields of terrorism and insurgency. The literature 
review focuses specifically on two factors that contribute to the confusion between terrorism and 
insurgency; 1) use of terrorism by terrorist and insurgent groups, and 2) the transformation from a 
terrorist group to an insurgency vice versa. The third chapter discusses the historical background that 
led to the deployment of AMISOM troops in 2007. The chapter explores the reoccurring themes in 
Somali history (reunification of the Somali people under one flag, the competing clan and Islamic 
identities, and the occupation of foreign powers). Al-Shabaab has incorporated these themes into their 
ideology to maximise their appeal in the Somali society. The fourth chapter, the analysis chapter, is 
divided into two sections. The first section discusses the body-count approach and its limitations, as 
well as the approach this dissertation is going to use, the contextualisation of the body-count approach. 
The second section examines the AMISOM’s progress in reducing al-Shabaab’s threat level in Somalia 
between 2007 and 2016. The analysis of the AMISOM’s progress is further divided into three sections; 
Phase one (2007 – 10 July 2010), Phase two (11 July 2010 – May 2012) and phase three (June 2012 to 
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Chapter Two: Literature review 
 
2.1: Introduction: the impact of 9/11 on the field of terrorism and insurgency  
The tragic events of September 11 and the decision by the US to invade Afghanistan and Iraq 
tremendously shaped the discourse in the fields of terrorism and insurgency. Richard Jackson notes that 
terrorism became the single most relevant security issue globally in the shortest amount of time.13 Bruce 
Hoffman adds that, although not every country is affected, many prioritised terrorism as a national and 
international political agenda.14 The spread of al-Qaida-affiliated groups and sympathisers throughout 
the world added pressure to countries to prioritise terrorism. At the same time, scholars examined ways 
to lessen the many ambiguities concerning the definition of terrorism and its relationship to an 
insurgency. Each country’s past experiences with terrorism and insurgencies shaped its narrative 
resulting in a lack of global definitional consensus. The lack of consensus remains a hindrance to the 
fight against international terrorism since countries cannot agree whether a group should be classified 
as a terrorist organisation or not.    
The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq challenged the previous understanding about 
insurgencies. Audrey Cronin states that these two wars forced the US and their allies to re-evaluate their 
understanding of CT and COIN. The two wars, she argues, illustrated how the nature of insurgency and 
terrorism had evolved significantly over the years.15 Most countries had experience fighting Classical 
or Local Insurgencies which were contained in one country, and in some cases, had sanctuaries in 
neighbouring states. Since then, the shifting global relations has resulted in the creation of three 
additional types of insurgencies, according to Gompert and Gordon.16 The authors maintain that 
governments must create counterinsurgency policies depending on the characteristics of the specific 
kind of insurgency they are fighting.17    
 
2:2: Confusion between terrorism and insurgency 
Clarifying the ambiguities surrounding terrorism and insurgency is crucial for the African context as 
groups such as al-Shabaab, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Boko Haram become more 
brazen with their attacks. Also, as the AU becomes increasingly involved in fighting such threats, it is 
vital that the institution realises the negative consequence related to creating policies based on the 
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miscategorisation of a group. Kydd and Walters advise governments to answer critical questions 
regarding the purpose, strategies and underlying assumptions of terrorism before creating a policy.18 
This chapter explores the ambiguities regarding the terrorism and insurgencies. Authors such as Michael 
Boyle and Gompert and Gordon have criticised the interchangeability of the terms terrorism and 
insurgency. Boyle claims some governments, their military and policymakers are treating the two 
concepts as if they were functionally equivalent to each other.19 Gompert and Gordon agree with Boyle, 
stating that although “terrorism is embedded in and subordinate to the insurgency”, terrorism also exists 
outside insurgency where groups are not interested in striving towards alternative solutions to socio-
politico-economic problems.20 Understand the distinction between the two concepts shapes the 
assumptions and direction of CT and COIN operations. Although differentiating factors contribute to 
the confusion between terrorism and insurgency, this chapter will elaborate on two critical factors; (1) 
the use of terrorism and (2) transforming from a terrorist group to an insurgency vice versa.  
 
2.2.1: Terrorists, insurgents and the use of terrorism  
One of the reasons why some governments, their military and policymakers interchangeably 
use the two terms is because they do not differentiate the use of terrorism by terrorists and insurgents. 
First and foremost, terrorism is a tactic utilised by both insurgent and terrorist groups to achieve their 
goal(s). It involves the use of weapons such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), armed assaults, 
kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings. There are three reasons why terrorists and insurgents use 
terrorism as a tactic. One, terrorism is used by terrorists and insurgents to communicate with a 
government(s) and the public. Terrorism provides the opportunity to gain domestic, and on some 
occasion international attention, which sheds light on their cause. The extra publicity can result in new 
members or sympathisers.21 Also, the use of terrorism illustrates to the society and the state their military 
strength. Both constituencies hope that their attacks will instil enough fear in the government and the 
public to willingly succumb to their demands.22 Kydd and Walters believe that this assumption is 
incorrect since the mere act of instilling fear destroys the possibility of achieving one’s goal.23 Two, 
terrorism is used by terrorists and insurgents to invoke a heavy-handed response by the government. A 
severe reaction can result in the decrease of the legitimacy of the state while increasing the terrorist and 
insurgents’ legitimacy. Also, a heavy-handed response can use propaganda to express to the public that 
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the government is not well equipped to protect them.24  Lastly, the use of terrorism can force the 
government to exhaust their resources fighting a tactic rather than tackling the root causes that influence 
people to conduct such acts.25  
Although both constituencies use terrorism, it is important to note that there is one significant 
difference between the use of terrorism by insurgents and terrorists. Moghadam, Berger and Beliakova 
stress that the use of terrorism and other forms of violence by insurgents is just one tactic in their quiver, 
along with propaganda, demonstrations, political mobilisation of constituencies, subversion, 
insurrection, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare.26 On the contrary, most terrorist groups use 
terrorism as their primary, if not only, mode of attack.27 Daniel Roper states that by understanding the 
role terrorism plays in an insurgency provides the clarity needed for the government to identify the real 
enemy and create effective countermeasures.28 Overall, it is important to remember it is not necessary 
for an insurgent group, unlike a terrorist group, to use terrorism.29 
The use of terrorism by terrorist and insurgent groups is dependent on their relationship to the 
population. Unquestionably, both organisations need a segment of the society to be supportive of their 
stated objectives. Both constituencies cannot survive without a steady flow of active and passive 
support.30 Some terrorist and insurgent groups have effectively utilised the internet to tap into more 
resources.31 The significance of the population is determined by how broad or narrow the goal(s) of 
both the constituencies are. In the case of terrorist organisations, most have narrow policy goals, 
therefore, needing only a few active members and a smaller segment of the population to support the 
cause. Since most terrorist groups do not require a great deal of public support, they are more willing 
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to target civilians.32 Cronin maintains the terrorists targeted civilians because they do not heavily rely 
on the public for backing and the probability of a heavy-handed response from the government.33   
Insurgents must maintain a close relationship with the public to establish their broad goal of 
creating an alternative government.34 To achieve this ambitious goal requires a large section of the 
people to support their cause. David Galula emphasises this point by asserting that insurgencies need a 
well-grounded cause that has the greatest potential to attract the most people.35 Additionally, through 
this partnership with the public, insurgents benefit from the pre-existing networks (village, tribe, family, 
neighbourhood, political or religious party) to propel the movement and evade CT and COIN 
operations.36  Thus, Weinberg and Eubank claim that indiscriminate attacks on the public must remain 
off limits.37 In a classical insurgency, insurgents targeted mainly military and governments posts, unlike 
terrorist organisations. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shed light on a new trend where 
insurgents will target anyone whom they believe will obstruct their goals including aid workers and 
civilians.38 In such cases, henceforth referred to as soft targets, some groups have warned the public 
about their intentions.39 
 
2.2.2: Transforming from a terrorist group to an insurgency  
The second reason why some governments, their militaries, and policymakers interchangeably 
use the two terms is due to the fact some terrorist groups have transformed into insurgencies vice versa. 
Daniel Byman and Jones and Libiscki warn of this growing trend when groups like Lashkar-e Taiba 
and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who have evolved into insurgent groups.40 Jones and Libiscki 
conclude that, based on their study of 84 terrorist groups that turned into insurgencies, that larger groups 
that have sizable public support are more likely to transform into insurgencies compared to smaller 
groups. The authors also note that this transformation is linked to groups with mid-level goals such as 
overthrowing the regime, secessionist movements, or territorial change. Moreover, they found that such 
groups are more willing to negotiate with the government than traditional insurgencies. In fact, nearly 
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half of the surveyed insurgencies settled with the government while the military defeated only 19% of 
them.41 When a terrorist group transforms into an insurgency, Colleen Bell maintains that the host 
government must modify the understanding of the threat, possibly lengthening the mission time-frame, 
re-evaluating the appropriate use of force and enabling a robust commitment to civilian forms of 
intervention.42    
 
2.3: Conclusion 
In conclusion, the threat of terrorism and insurgency is not a new phenomenon, even in the 
African continent. However, as the chapter has demonstrated, the events of September 11 and the 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq proved to be a catalyst in both fields. More scholars and institutions 
have dedicated their resources to understand the two concepts and lessen the ambiguities between 
terrorism and insurgency. A lack of understanding has led to some governments, their military and 
policymakers have used the terms terrorism and insurgency interchangeably which impacts their ability 
to counter the threat in the long run.  As the chapter has also demonstrated, the use of terrorism by 
insurgents and terrorists and the ability to transform from a terrorist group into an insurgency vice versa 
has contributed to the confusion between the two terms.   
This dissertation aims to contribute to the broader context of the analysis and evaluation of 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies, a significant research gap in the fields of terrorism 
and insurgency in Africa. Most of the research about terrorism and insurgency in the continent is about 
North Africa due to its proximity and similarities to the Middle East, henceforth referred to as the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). According to Gary LaFree’s research, the number of attacks in 
the MENA region has been increasing since the 1990s; almost doubling from 19% of all attacks in 
1990s to 32% in the 2000s.43 Terrorism and insurgency in the sub-Saharan context are still under-
researched topics despite the increased threat. Between 2000-2010, terrorist attacks in sub-Saharan 
Africa accounted for 7% of the worldwide attacks and 15% of the global fatalities.44 
As stated in the introductory chapter, contextualization of the available research is a major key 
to determine the success of a CT and COIN policies. Therefore, understanding the similarities and 
differences between a terrorist and insurgent group shapes which mode of warfare a country will use. 
The current literature mostly focuses on the history of Somalia and al-Shabaab and the various 
negotiations that have taken place since the fall of Saida Barre’s presidency in 1991. Additionally, many 
scholars have examined AFRICOM counterterrorism policy of kill and capture in Somalia. Some 
researchers have attempted review the various CT and COIN operations used by AMISOM, but not 
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many have evaluated the effectiveness of the efforts in reducing the threat al-Shabaab. The few scholars 
that have assessed the effectiveness have not explained the possible factors that have contributed to 
either the success or failure of the mission. Without an in-depth analysis, it becomes difficult to 
determine what is working and what needs to be changed to accommodate the evolving reality of the 
conflict. This paper aims to fill in the research gap by analysing and evaluating the CT and COIN 
operations employed by AMISOM, with the support of the US military, to reduce the threat of al-
Shabaab.  This paper also aims to discuss possible factors, such as over-militarisation, that have 
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Chapter Three: Somalia and al-Shabaab before the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
 
After decades of ‘failed’ missions by various international and regional actors, the AU sanctioned the 
creation of AMISOM in 2007, with the support of the UN and Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD). The decision was prompted by the realisation that as long as there are non-state 
actors such as al-Shabaab and other militias challenging the authority of the weak Somali Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG), there was a need to send troops to support the government. This chapter 
will provide the background information that sheds light on the rise of al-Shabaab and the need for the 
deployment of AMISOM.  
 
3.1: Pre-Colonial and Colonial History  
Somalia enjoyed periods of remarkable economic and political success before the colonial 
powers of Italy, France, United Kingdom (UK), and Abyssinian Kingdom (Ethiopia) changed the status 
quo. After centuries of living in various kingdoms, the Adal Sultanate formed in the early 1400s and 
sparked a golden age that lasted four centuries. The Adal Sultanate and the Sultanates that followed 
maintained robust trading systems, reliant on port cities of Mogadishu, Berbera, Kismayo, and Marka.45 
The flourishing trading systems, as well as the proximity to the Suez Canal, attracted European colonial 
powers.46 Despite having a decades-long exploitive relationship with the Somali traders, it was not until 
the “Scramble for Africa” initiated by the Berlin Conference in 1885 did France and Britain officially 
carve out a portion of the land for themselves in 1885 and 1886 subsequently.47 The Italian gained their 
colonial territory, Italian Somaliland, in Southern Somalia, in 1889.48 Based on British colonial 
accounts, the Ogaden region in Ethiopia was annexed by Abyssinian Empire in the 1890s.49 
From the very beginning, the Somali people objected to the invasion of European powers and 
the Abyssinian Kingdom. The most notable anti-colonial movement, led by Sayid Muhamad Adille 
Hassan, dubbed as the ‘Mad Mullah’ by the British, lasted from 1899 to 1920. Sayid Hassan believed 
in the unification of the Somali people under the banner of Islam would bring about the defeat of the 
colonial powers. He believed clannism could be cured if Islam was the primary identity of all Somali 
people. The strength of the British and Abyssinian armies and the lack of a unified vision among the 
Somali clans eventually led to the collapse of this anti-colonial movement.50 The end of World War 
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Two brought renewed efforts to fight against the invading forces. By this time, the British had 
incorporated the Italian Somaliland into their territory as the Italians surrendered their territories as a 
consequence of losing the war. After ten years, British Somaliland became the Republic of Somalia on 
July 1st, 1960.51 
 
3.2: The first government (1960-1969)  
The first Somali government after independence, under the leadership of Aden Abdullah 
Osman Daar and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, had the arduous task of rebuilding a functional state that 
could overcome the negative impact of colonialism.52 The most prominent challenge the government 
tackled was the unification of the Somali people who are divided into four countries. The four areas 
include the British and Italian Somaliland that became the Republic of Somalia, French Somaliland 
(Republic of Djibouti), Northern Frontier District (Northern Kenya) and the Ogaden region (Ethiopia). 
Currently, the desire to establish Greater Somalia includes annexing the independent and semi-
autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland, which seceded after the fall of General Said Barre in 
1991 and 1998 respectively.53 According to Charles Geshekter, “Somalis believe that unification of 
Somali-inhabited lands is essential for sustaining the connections between territoriality and their ability 
to survive as people without which regional peace and political stability remain unattainable.”54 The 
first irredentist attempt came when the Somali government supported the Northern Province People’s 
Progressive Party (NPPPP), an ethnically Somali political party in Kenya, to wage war against the new 
Kenyan administration in 1963.55 The guerrilla war, dubbed as the Shifta War, lost momentum after 
Prime Minister Mohamed Egal signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) assuring the Kenyan 
government that the Somali government would stop assisting the secessionist movement in 1967.56 The 
lack of support from the Somali government and Kenyan Somalis forced NPPPP to end the Shifta war.57     
Clannism is the second major challenge that the first Somali government faced. The five Somali 
clan families, i.e. Doraad, Isaaq, Dir, Hawiye, and Rahanweyn are divided into smaller sub-clans.58 M. 
J. Fox states that despite being under various Sultanates and colonial rule, the clans and sub-clans 
maintained their independence and self-reliance.59 The clan system helped to create a shared identity 
that maintained law and order through the enforcement of Xeer or customary laws. With the 
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introduction of Islam into the Horn of Africa in the 7th century, all the clans found ways to harmonise 
the Xeer and Sharia laws with the help of village elders, or the Guurti, who facilitated all communal 
problems by facilitating community-wide consensus-based discussions.60 Regardless of the attempts to 
balance between the Islamic and clan identities, the deeply embedded clan system ensured that the 
Somalis primary loyalty was to the clan.61 The colonial dynamics in which some clan-families and sub-
clans were favoured over others and the impact on clans based on the differing colonial governance 
styles worsened the clan rivalries.62 
To ensure all the clans were appeased, the President Daar attempted to implement the agreed 
upon stipulations created during the pre-independence period. During that period, the Somali elite 
agreed that the position of president would rotate to all regions in the country to ensure the 
representation of all clans and their sub-clans.63 Moreover, the Somali government attempted to create 
a comprehensive, consensus-based political structure that overcomes the heightened clan rivalries. 
Despite their intentions, the first government could not keep its promise since the Doraad and Hawiye, 
southern clans-families and sub-clans, dominated all branches of government.64 From 1960-1969, the 
Darood clan dominated the parliament, taking approximately two-thirds of the available seats.65  
 
3.3: Said Barre presidency (1969-1988)    
1969 was a significant turning point in Somali political history as General Mohamed Said Barre 
staged a bloodless coup,66 days after the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke.67 General 
Barre, who ruled Somalia for more than two-decades afterwards, faced similar challenges as the first 
government, i.e. clannism and irredentist aspirations. His hostile and oppressive policies added a new 
dimension to Somali history in which the government persecuted clan and sub-clan opposition and 
Islamic groups. These three elements, which cannot be looked at singularly as they are heavily 
intertwined, served as catalysts to the instability in the country.  
In his quest to alleviate clannism in Somalia through his policy of ‘Scientific Socialism,’68 
General Barre worsened clan rivalries. Like Sayid Hassan, President Barre believed that clannism is a 
major challenge that the Somali people need to overcome, hence, advocated for a unified Somali 
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identity. He also believed that clannism is a contributing factor to economic and political stagnation.69 
His poorly executed plans solidified the control of the government and military in the hands of three 
Darood sub-clans; the Marehan, i.e. Said Barre’s sub-clan, Ogaden, and Dhulbahante. This alliance, 
known as MOD, propelled sub-clan interests to the national level.70 One of the consequences of this 
type of governance is that individuals become loyal to a person rather than an institution or the state, 
the exact opposite of his policy’s intentions. Moreover, General Barre continued to antagonise the Isaaq 
clan, further creating tension between the southern and northern clans. In 1978, after the disastrous 
Ogaden war with Ethiopia in 1977, the tensions between the government and the Isaaq clan worsened 
after they were suspected to be involved in an attempted military coup, with support from the 
Majeerteen sub-clan, part of the Darood clan.71 In retaliation, the president sent Ogadeni militias into 
the traditionally Isaaq territory to antagonise them.72 Following the execution of seventeen Majeerteen 
military officials, many officers fled to Ethiopia to escape prosecutions and joined opposition groups 
seeking to overthrow the dictatorship.73 
Like the first government, General Barre wanted to unify the Somali people under one flag. He 
went to war with Ethiopia to reclaim the Ogaden region. His decision to annexe this region possibly 
stems from the fact that the Ogaden sub-clan was an instrumental part of the MOD alliance. The Ogaden 
sub-clan in Somalia also had close relations with the nationalist groups operating in Ethiopia such as 
the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). By the time that Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1978, the 
government had significantly built its military capabilities as a result of Cold War politics. However, 
when the conflict commenced, Cold War alliances had shifted. The Soviet Union was solely supporting 
Ethiopia, and the US was helping Somalia.74 Despite its military superiority, Somalia and its allies 
suffered a devastating loss. The Somali government signed an agreement with the Ethiopian 
government in the late 1980s in which both sides pledged not to aid any opposition groups operating in 
their respective countries.75     
After a decade of General Barre’s oppressive and divisive policies, Islamic opposition groups 
began forming in the 1980s. Groups such as al-Ittihad al-Islamiyah (AIAI),  and Ahlu Sunna wa al-
Jama’a (ASWJ) publicly criticised General Barre’s controversial policies.76 The rise of Islamic 
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opposition coincided with the movements in the Arab and Muslim world that called for the rejuvenation 
of Islamic traditions as a means to fix socio-political problems within the country.77 The popularity of 
such group triggered repressive protocols such as mass arrests and executions. In one instance, on 23 
January 1975, the government executed ten prominent Islamic leaders who had been vocal about their 
dissatisfaction with the government. The government claimed that these leaders were “bad Muslims.” 
Participants of mass protests were arrested and jailed with no due process.78 The retaliation from the 
government forced many of these groups to operate underground.  
 
3.4: Civil War (1988-1992) 
In addition to the Islamic opposition groups, secular, nationalist groups operating within 
Somalia and in other countries also began forming in the 1980s. Although there were many opposition 
groups, only a few played vital roles in the fall of General Barre’s regime in 1991. By 1988, the 
conditions within the country had worsened significantly that the Somali National Movement (SNM), 
a coalition of mainly Isaaq sub-clans, began attacking government and military posts in Northern 
Somalia, initiating the Civil War.79 The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), an Ogadeni sub-clan militia, 
and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SDDF), a Majeerteen sub-clan militia, fought the 
government forces in Southern Somalia.80 The United Somali Congress (USC), a coalition of mainly 
Hawiye sub-clans, fought against the Barre regime in Mogadishu and the surrounding areas. The USC 
became the strongest opposition group after the Somali Armed Forces (SAF) troops staged a mutiny in 
1989 and joined the militia.81 
As the pressure from opposition mounted on all sides, the General simultaneously attempted to 
negotiate with and brutally suppress opposition.82 The government conducted aerial assaults on cities,83  
door-to-door searches and mass arrests of protestors and police and military indiscriminately killed 
civilians.84 As General Barre brutally silenced the opposition, he simultaneously attempted to create 
changes within his administration to appease the public. President Barre assured the people that he 
would allow multiparty elections, which would take place on February 1st, 1991 after a council drafted 
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constitutional changes. 85 Despite his efforts, the president undermined his progress by backtracking on 
agreed upon resolutions which fuelled the desire of opposition groups to continue fighting. 86 
The fall of Said Barre came during the final Battle of Mogadishu in December 1990 to January 
1991. By this point, the USC had created an alliance with SPM and SNM, who were also supported by 
the Ethiopian government.87 The successful battle resulted in Said Barre and his supporters fleeing to 
the port city of Kismayo in Southern Somalia, which was under the control of General Morgan, Said 
Barre’s brother-in-law.88 The Somali Civil War resulted in the deaths of at least 300,000 Somalis due 
to war-related casualties, hunger, and diseases.89 
 
3.5: International and regional attempts to create a federal government (1991 – 
2007)  
The fall of General Said Barre’s regime on 27th January 1991 created a power vacuum and 
consequently, opposition groups began to fight each other for the control of the country. The alliances 
created to topple the regime quickly disintegrated soon after USC took over Mogadishu. With the USC 
controlling the seat of government, the other opposition groups carved territory in other parts of the 
country. Each group sought to advance the interest of their clan or sub-clan instead of fighting for 
national interests.  
The first major effort to create a stable federal government in Somalia came as soon as USC 
took control of Mogadishu. This attempt failed due to the internal fighting between the two main 
leaders, Ali Mahdi and General Aideed who disagreed about the process of creating a new interim 
government. As a result, the USC split into two warring factions.90 Ali Mahdi with his Habr Abgal sub-
clan supporters rebranded the USC into the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA),91 while General Aideed 
created Somali National Alliance (SNA), a Habr Gedir sub-clan militia.92 The second effort came as a 
result of the international community’s concern regarding the fighting between SSA and SNA in 
Mogadishu. This effort also failed despite the creation of the United Nation Operation to Somalia 
(UNOSOM I and II) in 1992 and 1993 respectively, and the deployment of United Task Force in 
Somalia (UNITAF), a US military operation in 1993. The US withdrew its troops from Somalia 
following the infamous Black Hawk Down attack in which suspected Aideed supporters shot down a 
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US plane killing eighteen soldiers in 1993.93 All US and UN personnel withdrew out of Somalia by the 
end of 1995.94        
Unlike other parts of the country, clans in Northern Somalia consolidated their power and 
created an independent state or semi-autonomous region. Under the leadership of the SNM, the Isaaq 
clan seceded from the Republic of Somalia, forming the Republic of Somaliland on May 18th, 1991, 
although not recognised by any country in the world.95 In 1998, the Puntland region in the Northwest 
region of Somalia followed in the footsteps of Somalilanders but chose to become an autonomous 
region. Although not independent, Puntland had its local government but also participates in the affairs 
of the Republic of Somalia.96    
The new millennium brought renewed efforts to establish a federal government in Somalia. 
IGAD invited a select few warring factions to the negotiation table in Djibouti. The first attempt, the 
Arta Declaration, which created the Transitional National Government (TNG) and the Transitional 
National Assembly (TNA), was signed in Djibouti in 2000. The TNG proved to be infective in bringing 
any incremental change as it was riddled with corruption, anti-Ethiopia rhetoric and was unable to 
extend its authority outside Mogadishu.97 In 2004, as part of the Eldoret Conference process, a new 
Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) were 
created.  The new government, led by a pro-Ethiopia President Abdullahi Yusuf, agreed to keep the 4.5 
formula from the Atra Declaration which stated that the four main clans, Doraad, Hawiye, Dir, and 
Rahanweyn, would have equal representation in parliament while the rest of the seats will belong to the 
other small clans.98 
 
3.6: The rise of Islamic groups, including al-Shabaab, after the fall of Said Barre’s 
regime (1991-2007)    
Amid the chaos of the Civil War, Islamic groups began operating above ground, becoming 
potential contenders for political power. The foundation of al-Shabaab lies inside the successes and 
structures of its predecessors, AIAI and United Islamic Courts (UIC). As briefly discussed in a previous 
subsection, AIAI formed in the early 1980s as an opposition group against President General Barre. 
The fall of the government in 1991 allowed for AIAI, under the leadership of Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, 
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formally known as Abu Mansur,99 to gain widespread support especially in Mogadishu, Gedo, and 
Lower Jubba.100 The group’s primary goal was the reunification of all Somali people under an Islamic 
government.101 According to Menkhaus and Docking, “AIAI…adopted a long-term strategy to prepare 
Somalia for Islamic rule by building up its activities in education, media, judiciary, and commerce, and 
has deemphasised the use of violence as a tactic.”102 Like other opposition groups, AIAI relied on clan 
alliances to recruit members. In their case, they had the support of the mainly Darood clan but also the 
Hawiye and Isaaq clans.103 The Ethiopian government believed that the growing popularity of AIAI 
threatened its sovereignty. Their fears materialised when AIAI conducted grenade attacks in Dire Dawa 
and Addis Ababa killing dozens in 1995 and 1996. As a result, Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 1997 which, 
along with the decision by the US to classify the group as a terrorist organisation following the 
declaration of ‘War on Terror,’ caused its eventual demise. 104   
The fall of AIAI resulted in the emergence of various splintering groups including the UIC.105 
The UIC, although stemming from the AIAI’s Islamic courts, emerged as a moderate group that 
protected the interests of Mogadishu business community who were tired of paying taxes to warlords.106 
The business community believed in UIC’s ability to maintain peace and security, despite their Islamic 
rhetoric.107 The UIC benefited from AIAI’s pre-existing networks, especially since the top leaders such 
as Sheikh Robow, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad, and Hassan Dahir Aweys became part of the top 
echelon of the UIC.108 After years of consolidating power within and outside Mogadishu, UIC 
successfully challenged the TFG’s authority in Mogadishu in 2006 forcing the government to move its 
seat to Baidoa.109 Ethiopia invaded Somalia for the second time in less than a decade to support the pro-
                                                          
     99 Richard Barno, ‘Africa’s Responses to the Terrorism Threat: Perspectives from the IGAD Region’, in 
Understanding Terrorism in Africa: In Search for an African Voice, ed. F. Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha 
(Institute for Security Studies, 2007), 95; Christopher Harnisch, ‘The Terror Threat from Somalia: The 
Internationalization of Al Shabaab’, Critical Threats, 12 February 2010, 10, 
http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/terror-threat-somalia-internationalization-al-shabaab-feb-12-2010. 
     100 For a detailed understanding about the  AIAI’s origin, refer to ‘Somalia’s Islamists’; Barno, ‘Africa’s 
Responses to the Terrorism Threat: Perspectives from the IGAD Region’. 
     101 Ken Menkhaus and Tim Docking, ‘Special Report: Terrorism in the Horn of Africa’ (United States 
Institute of Peace, 2004), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr113.pdf. 
     102 Menkhaus and Docking, 10. 
     103 Virginia Luling, ‘Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State’, Third World Quarterly 18, no. 2 
(1997): 296. Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan, ‘The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts’, Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 1, no. 2 (2007): 152–53. 
     104 Thomas Dempsey, ‘Counter-Terrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions’ (All 
Strategic Studies Institute, April 2006), 13, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub649.pdf. 
     105 ‘Somalia’s Islamists’, 9. 
     106 Roland Marchal, ‘The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat Al-Shabaab Al 
Mujaheddin in Somalia’ (CNRS, March 2011), 14. 
     107 Karl Sandstom, ‘Contextual Disconnect: The Failure of the International Community in Somalia’, in 
Somalia Multilateral, International, and Transnational Repercussions of Conflict (New York: Bloomsbury, 
2013), 52. 
     108 ‘Somalia: Al-Shabaab - It Will Be a Long War’, Policy Briefing (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis 
Group, 26 June 2014), 6. 
     109 Abdel Bari Atwan, After Bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the Next Generation (New York: The New Press, 2012), 
113. 
 
28 | P a g e  
 
Ethiopian government with the full support of the US in December 2006. Within a month, the coalition 
had managed to remove the UIC from Mogadishu but could not reinstall the TFG in the capital city. 
The constant military pressure from the Ethiopian military forced many UIC leaders such as Sheikh 
Sharif to turn themselves into the allied forces while other leaders fled to neighbouring countries.110 By 
the beginning of 2007, UIC splintered into two groups, Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) led by Dahir 
Aweys and al-Shabaab.111 
By the time the AU and UN approved AMISOM, al-Shabaab was in its infancy. Before 2007, 
al-Shabaab was the military wing of the UIC,112 founded by Sheikh Mukhtar Aby Zubayr, commonly 
referred to as Godane, Ibrahim Haji Jamaa al-Afghani, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow and Aden Hashi 
Aryo.113 After splintering from UIC, al-Shabaab moved its operations to Southern Somalia where they 
conducted joint attacks with remnants of UIC against the Ethiopian and TFG forces.114  
 
3.7: Conclusion   
In the four-decade history of the Republic of Somalia before the deployment of AMISOM 
troops are categorised with the prevalence of three occurring themes: 1) unification of the Somali 
people, (2) occupation by foreign powers, and (3) the Somali identity (Islam and the clan). As this 
chapter has demonstrated, the question of the reunification of Greater Somalia is a critical issue. So far, 
the problem has been dealt with militarily, i.e. the Shifta and Ogaden War. The need for unification of 
the Somali people is a consequence of occupation by foreign powers. From the very beginning, the 
Somali people have fought against the invading forces as seen with Sayid Hassan in the 1890s. The 
same sentiment is still felt today with the spread of the anti-Ethiopian rhetoric as Ethiopia is viewed as 
a colonial power. As a means to unify the Somali people and fight against the foreign forces, the 
question of identity always arises. As illustrated by Sayid Hassan accounts, Somali people wondered 
which identity should prevail, the Islamic or the clan identity. Since independence, Somali governments 
have tried to lessen the problem of clannism by attempting to create a system in which all clans feel 
represented within the state. Despite the noble intentions, especially with the 4.5 formula, the Doraad 
clan and its sub-clans have dominated governmental posts.  
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The deployment of AMISOM troop in 2007 is the latest attempt to fix the power vacuum 
created after the fall of Said Barre’s regime in 1991 by the regional and international organisation. As 
the chapter has demonstrated, previous attempts (UNOSOM I, UNITAF, UNOSOM II) failed to create 
any substantial peace agreements. The new millennium brought with it renewed hope with the signing 
of Arta Declaration and the Eldoret Conference agreement. The decisions agreed upon on these two 
occasions influence the mandate and operations of AMISOM as IGAD countries accept it as the basis 
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Chapter Four: Analysis of Counterterrorism and 
Counterinsurgency operations by AMISOM (2007-2016) 
 
4.1: Introduction   
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the scholarship behind 
what constitutes counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. This section also includes an 
explanation of the body-count approach, the most used method of evaluating CT and COIN policies, 
and why AMISOM uses this approach. This segment will explain how this paper plans to assess and 
analyse AMISOM’s CT and COIN operations. The second section of this chapter analyses the 
AMISOM’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Somalia. The analysis is divided into 
three phases; Phase one (January 2007- 11 July 2010), Phase two (12 July 2010 – May 2012) and Phase 
three (June 2012 – December 2016).  This section contextualises the data provided by GTD and the 
information provided by the UN, AU and other scholarly articles to explain whether the CT and COIN 
operations by AMISOM, supported by the US military, have impacted al-Shabaab's ability to conduct 
attacks in Somalia and the Eastern Africa region. This dissertation argues that the weak initial mandate 
and inadequate troop strength during the first phase permitted al-Shabaab to grow into a fully-fledged 
insurgency that maintained domestic support. This dissertation also argues that AMISOM’s inability to 
recognise al-Shabaab’s change of tactic (relinquishing of territorial gains) during the last Battle of 
Mogadishu and thereafter and lack of understanding about the use of terrorism by the group have 
contributed to AMISOM’s slow progress. This dissertation concludes that, although the COIN and CT 
have affected al-Shabaab, the group still possesses the capability to conduct frequent attacks in Somalia 
and the neighbouring region. The most notable of these negative impacts is the rise of infighting among 
the top echelon.  
 
4.2: Section one: counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and evaluation 
methods  
4.2.1: What constitutes counterterrorism and counterinsurgency?     
Counterterrorism is an enemy-centric approach that stresses the destruction of the human and 
the military capability of the target with the end goal of terminating them altogether.115 Richard Barrett 
states, “the main objective of [a] counterterrorism policy should be to make it as hard as possible for 
terrorists to mount attacks, not just by denying them the means and targets, but also by denying them 
sympathisers and recruits.”116 The two main ways governments conduct counterterrorism operations is 
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by using the war-model or the judicial-model. Crelinsten explains that the main goal of the war model 
is to use maximum force to overpower and defeat the enemy.117 Rineheart supplements Crelinsten’s 
idea, adding that the war model is mostly a series of offensive operations where the military utilises 
hard power tactics such as drone and aerial bombings targeting the capabilities of terrorist organisations, 
i.e. military arsenals and training camps.118 A significant element of this approach is decapitation, the 
killing or arresting the leaders and the top echelon of an organisation by using airstrikes, drone strikes, 
covert actions, and raids.119 Decapitation is at the centre of AMISOM strategy in Somalia. Gompert and 
Gordon warn that lethal and destructive capabilities of the military if used ineffectively, will lessen 
sympathy and support for the government. The authors’ advise governments to use force precisely and 
in proportion to the threat.120 The judicial model is increasingly accepted as an essential element of 
counterterrorism, especially as the threat of transnational terrorism becomes increasingly evident. 
Countries and international and regional institutions like the UN and AU have adopted anti-terrorism 
legislation. Many of these laws have ambiguously defined terrorism and terrorist organisations, and 
criminalise terror-related actions such as recruiting and financing designated terror groups.121 These 
anti-terrorism laws are also used to prosecuted captured insurgents when they have been accused of 
committing terror attacks. Intelligence gathering is crucial for both the war and judicial models as it 
provides information regarding safe havens, key individuals and future attacks.122   
Counterinsurgency is a population-centric approach aimed at winning the hearts and minds of 
the population. To this end, the operations stress the importance of creating rifts between the insurgents 
and the population.123 Colleen Bell argues that COIN operations are distinct from CT in that the 
government understands that an insurgency problem cannot be solved with the military alone; it is 
necessary to look at the root causes.124 Ucko adds that governments should use a mixture of military 
and non-military COIN strategies to lessen the chances of backlash from the public from heavy-handed 
responses.125 In the case of Somalia, the COIN element of creating rifts between the insurgents and the 
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population by instituting reforms is the responsibility of the Somali government, which is beyond the 
scope of this paper. AMISOM’s primary COIN objective is conducting Clear, Hold and Build 
operations.126 During the clearing phase, most militaries, including AMISOM, focus on recovery of 
strategic locations such as such as port cities, and towns with access to natural resources.127 The 
liberation of cities is viewed as reinstating the legitimacy of the state., which Bo Rothstein argues is 
lost when segments of the population take up arms and challenge the state’s authority.128 Moreover, Lea 
Ypi argues that seizing territory from the state challenges the conceptualisation of a country’s 
legitimacy because the exercise of political authority is dependent on exclusive territorial control.129 
After clearing territory of insurgent activity, the next step is to secure the newly acquired territory and 
then finishing with the re-building the political and economic structures that might have been removed 
or deteriorated under the insurgent rule.130 
 
4.2.2: Introduction to the evaluation of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
operations 
4.2.2.1: Introduction to the body-count approach  
As stated in the literature review, there are some ambiguities in the fields of terrorism and 
insurgency.  These ambiguities stretch into how CT and COIN are evaluated. There is no universally 
accepted method to determine the effectiveness of CT and COIN operations. As a result, various schools 
of thought have arisen to fill in the procedural void. The most favoured of these schools of thought is 
the body-count approach. Championed by governments, this method calls for the statistical analysis of 
CT indicators such as the number of incidents and casualties suffered, plots foiled, destruction of safe 
havens and training camps, leaders and members killed or arrested, disruption of recruitment flow or 
the amount of terrorist funding seised, and COIN indicators such as territorial gains.131 As terrorism 
becomes transnational and partnerships between terrorist and insurgent groups grow, governments have 
also begun to look at the spread of terrorism into neighbouring countries as an indicator.132 
Governments, scholars and institutions use the body-count approach because they believe that 
the indicators mentioned above will best explain the evolution and effectiveness of CT and COIN 
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operations over time. They argue the decrease in the numbers is a sign of the effectiveness of a policy.133  
Audrey Cronin observes that this approach is drawn from militaries and early terrorism scholars who 
used classical military measurements during war, i.e. territory gained, number of incident and casualties 
suffered, or leaders killed or arrested, to evaluate counterterrorism policies.134 Nadav Morgan maintains 
that this approach can give an overall picture regarding the success of terrorist activities.135 Overall, the 
body-count approach rests on the assumption that these indicators will provide the best picture of 
whether or not a terrorist or insurgent group enjoys the freedom to operate.  
The body-count approach is not without critics. Byman notes that body-count approach can be 
misleading since many of those who are killed or captured are usually low-level recruits who can be 
easily replaced. Moreover, he adds that this approach does not “reflect the impact on the adversary’s 
morale, recruitment, fundraising, and residual ability to conduct sophisticated attacks.” 136 He concludes 
that this approach should not be used as the only and concrete measure of success and failure of 
counterterrorism policies. Morag challenges the notion of victory in the body-count school of thought, 
stating that the concept of victory is not the same in terrorism as it is in war. For starters, with war, it is 
easier to determine the hostile army, and for the most part, there is sufficient knowledge, due to 
intelligence, about their military capability. This is not the case with terrorism and insurgency; terrorists 
and insurgents do not have clear uniform and insignias (other than flags) to distinguish themselves from 
non-combatants. Additionally, it is not always obvious who exactly the threat is or if they have been 
fully neutralised. Also, gathering information about the groups is significantly harder than with a hostile 
nation. Therefore, focusing on destruction and damage of resources of economic and military 
importance, infrastructure and reclaiming territory is not enough information to inform whether the 
threat of terrorism or insurgency has been neutralised.137 Barrett criticises the use of decapitation as a 
measure of victory, maintaining that these authors assume that the “more terrorists killed or 
incarcerated, the fewer will remain the cause of concern.”138 This assumption goes back to the point 
stated earlier by Byman that most of the captured and killed are usually low-level recruits who can be 
replaced easily. Cronin agrees with Barrett, adding that terrorist groups like al-Qaida are still able to 
carry out terrorist attacks even when they appear weakened by counterterrorism operations.139 Finally, 
Raphael Perl argues that purely body-account approach does not consider unintended consequences of 
CT and COIN operations such as radicalisation. He also states that this method propels the 
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misconception that increasing military expenditures assists with the progress of the mission, which is 
not necessarily the case.140   
 
4.2.2.2: AMISOM’s measure of success  
PSC and UN reports, press releases, and communiques discuss AMISOM’s perceived successes 
and challenges. The perceived successes are measured by whether AMISOM has achieved its primary 
objective: to increase the security and peace in Somalia by combating all insurgent and terrorist groups 
including al-Shabaab. These primary sources do not explain how the success is measured. However, an 
overview of these published documents shows that AMISOM uses the body-count approach to measure 
their success. These reports mention the number of recaptured towns and cities, number of leaders and 
top echelon killed by American and AMISOM targeted airstrikes and drone strikes or arrested, increases 
in troop strength, number of foiled attacks, and the increase or decrease in the number of casualties and 
attacks. Some of the documents discuss the AMISOM ’s success in restricting al-Shabaab’s freedom to 
operate, but they have not mentioned how came to this conclusion. This paper assumes that this analysis 
is based on the body-count approach; the increase and decrease of the data are equated to the success 
or failure of the operations.  
 
4.2.2.3: How is this dissertation going to evaluate CT and COIN operations?    
Due to the lack of a unified method to evaluate CT and COIN strategies, this paper will follow 
the guidance of authors such as Nadav Morag, Alexander Spencer and Teun Van Dongen who advocate 
for the contextualisation of the body-account approach. One of the major problems of the body-count 
approach is that it assumes that the increase or decrease of the figures are a direct result of the 
counterinsurgents’ actions. The contextualisation of the body-count approach calls for the factoring of 
operations and tactics employed by both the counterinsurgents and the threat (insurgents or terrorists).  
The authors mentioned above argue that the increase and decrease in numbers is not always an indicator 
of the success or failure of CT and COIN operations.141 These authors claim that the Dongen explains 
that there are at least two possible reasons for the increase in the number of attacks; 1) a group trying 
to send a message to its members and the government about their perceived strength, and 2) to increase 
radicalisation.142 Spencer insists that a decrease in attacks can be a result of the group’s decision to shift 
its resources to other activities such as recruitment and increase their military capabilities.143 Moreover, 
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Morag notes that the decrease in the number of attacks could be a result of a change in tactics due to 
the ever-evolving conflict environment.144 Dongen reminds governments and policymakers that the 
increase of casualties, based on existing research, is a sign of weakness of a group since they most likely 
have changed from hard to soft targets which increases the chances of having a devastating attack. 145 
In the same way that an increase in casualties does not mean failure of CT or COIN operations, the 
decrease in the frequency of attacks or casualties does not equate to success or effectiveness. Dongen 
and Spencer assert that the decreases can be a result of the group trying to save its resources for a bigger 
and more advanced attack(s). Additionally, the decrease can be a result of the group trying not to agitate 
its support base and potential supporters with devastating attacks. These groups rely on the active and 
passive support of the public, and too many high-casualty attacks will challenge their legitimacy.146  
This dissertation contextualises of the data provided by GTD, UN and AU reports and other 
scholarly works to explain the impact of COIN and CT operations by AMISOM, supported by the US 
military, on al-Shabaab’s ability to conduct attacks in Somalia and the region. This approach will 
provide a better image of why the number and frequency of attacks, as well as sum of casualties, has 
been steadily increasing since AMISOM’s deployment in 2007. Additionally, this approach considers 
the evolution of the conflict environment, i.e. the increased or decreased capabilities and change of 
tactics by both the government and al-Shabaab to explain the increase or decrease in the number and 
frequency of attacks and casualties. Furthermore, this paper examines how AMISOM’s decisions 
impacted the progress of the mission. Therefore, contextualisation informs the fluctuation of data as a 
result of AMISOM’s operations, decisions and implementation of those military operations and al-
Shabaab’s change of tactics and strategy. Also, this method of analysis challenges the presumed 
successes claimed by AMISOM and their allies. 
 
4.3: Section two: Analysis of CT and COIN operations by AMISOM 
4.3.1: Phase one (January 2007- 10 July 2010)    
4.3.1.1: AMISOM’s structure and CT and COIN operations during the first phase   
As stated in the introduction chapter, by the time AU and UN-authorised AMISOM in February 
2007, the ENDF, with the support of the US, had dethroned the UIC in December 2006. Following this 
event, al-Shabaab moved its operations to Southern Somalia. Although the UIC had been defeated, the 
ENDF could not assist the TFG to move its operations from Baidoa to Mogadishu. Similarly to the fall 
of General Barre, the fall of the UIC caused a power struggle in Mogadishu among the warlords and 
militias who had gained significant power since 1991.147   
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As a peace-support mission, AMISOM troops could not engage militarily with any non-state 
actor such as al-Shabaab unless in self-defence. As a result, the troops were limited to conducting 
defensive COIN operations.148 This included the protection of vital installations such as airports, 
seaports, federal buildings and the presidential palace in Mogadishu which were under constant attacks 
from terrorist and insurgent groups.149 In addition, AMISOM acted as a mediator between the TFG and 
other non-state actors who wanted to join forces with the government such as Alliance for the 
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT),150 Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ),151 and 
Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS).  Additionally, the coalition forces monitored and 
verified the terms of the ceasefire after the success of the peace negotiations. 152 
From the very beginning of the mission, the US military offered to assist AMISOM with CT 
operations as part of their ‘War on Terror.’ Since the US was uninterested in sending boots on the 
ground, they conducted airstrikes targeting top leaders and echelon of al-Shabaab. A year after 
AMISOM deployed its first troops to Somalia, US airstrike killed Aden Hashi Ayro, then Emir or leader 
of the al-Shabaab, which ushered the reign of Godane.153 Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a senior commander 
of al-Qaida East Africa division and al-Shabaab commander, was killed during a US special forces raid 
in Baraawe in 2009.154 The military pressure caused two senior al-Shabaab operatives, Ali Hassan 
Gheddi and Mohamed Faruq, as well as 500-foot soldiers, to defected to SAF and AMISOM forces.155   
 
4.3.1.2: Analysis of COIN and CT operations  
AMISOM’s lack of progress during the first phase was limited was a direct consequence of the 
weak mandate. The peace-support classification was not ideal for the conflict environment since troops 
cannot enforce peace when there is no peace to keep.156 In fact, Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye claim it 
is unreasonable to think that AMISOM could achieve substantial gains with a weak mandate.157 
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Available research indicates immediate military pressure on an infant terrorist group is crucial as they 
are more susceptible to CT and COIN operations. As a matter of fact, 90% of terrorist groups do not 
survive past the first year. Of those who survive past the first year, more than half of them will collapse 
during the first decade of their existence.158 Jenna Jordan’s research shows that, although decapitation 
is ineffective as a long-term strategy, younger groups are more susceptible to the policy.159 The longer 
the terrorist group survives, the harder it becomes to defeat the organisation since they have created 
solid roots in the community. 
AMISOM’s lack of sufficient troop strength contributed to the lack of progress during the first 
phase. The mission anticipated that Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) would donate nine infantry 
battalions composed of 850 troops each and another 350 personnel, who would be part of the civilian 
component of the mission.160 While operating at a capacity of 65% by the end of the first phase, the 
coalition forces could not effectively protect the intended infrastructure while also protecting 
themselves and government officials from attacks from al-Shabaab and other militants.161 ENDF’s 
decision to withdraw its forces by the end of 2009 added pressure on AMISOM.  ENDF was the only 
force conducting military operations aimed at stopping the progress of militant groups. Consequent to 
ENDF’s departure, many of the areas under their control such as Beledweyne, Baidoa, Kismayo, Hudur 
and parts of Mogadishu district fell into the hands of al-Shabaab and other clan and religious militias.162 
According to a UN report, the areas that fell into al-Shabaab hands were done peacefully through 
negotiation with clans.163 The alliances forged between militias and the government during this phase 
provided temporary relief because they assisted AMISOM and the Somali Armed Forces (SAF) with 
the protection of checkpoints.164 Despite the limitations, AMISOM’s efforts allowed TFG to move all 
its operations from Baidoa to Mogadishu.165 Once the capital city was fully secured, AMISOM 
anticipated to gradually extend the authority of the TFG to other parts of the country.166       
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Figure 1: Number of attacks conducted by al-Shabaab during phase one 
(Source: Global Terrorism Database) 
 
4.3.1.3: al-Shabaab’s transformation into an insurgency 
The lack of offensive military operations provided al-Shabaab with the necessary environment 
to rebrand themselves and solidify their support base in Somalia. While transforming from a terrorist 
group to an insurgency, al-Shabaab dedicated its resources to attracting followers with a compelling 
cause. al-Shabaab rebranded themselves into an Islamic and nationalistic group. Unlike their 
predecessor UIC, they believed in the strict observance of the Quran and interpretation of the Sharia 
laws. The Somali group claimed that the Somali Muslim community was under attack from “the foreign 
Christian occupation” i.e. AMISOM. This narrative justified the resistance to many Somalis and other 
Muslims who joined the fight. al-Shabaab welcomed foreign fighters into its ranks without any 
conditions, unlike the UIC who wanted to a uniquely Somali struggle.167 Based on a 2012 PSC report, 
al-Shabaab has between 1000 and 1500 foreign fighters at their disposal. 168 To appeal to nationalists in 
Somalia, al-Shabaab pushed the anti-Ethiopian agenda, driven by the presence of Ethiopian troops in 
Mogadishu after the defeat of UIC.169 Many Somalis consider the ENDF as an occupation and 
illegitimate force.170 Additionally, al-Shabaab promised to reunify the Somali people under one flag, an 
idea that many Somalis, including previous Somali governments, desired.171 To al-Shabaab’s credit, 
available research states that religious and nationalistic groups are the hardest to counter and have longer 
life spans because they can attract the largest support from the population.172 
With a noteworthy cause, al-Shabaab focused on the solidification of the popular support in 
and out of Somalia. As stated in the literature review, the success of an insurgency rests on their 
relationship with the population. al-Shabaab dedicated their resources to strengthening their affiliation 
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with inherited UIC and AIAI networks, i.e. clan and business connections. Since most of the top echelon 
and foot soldiers immediately joined the ranks,173 the militant group enjoyed the freedom of movement 
in traditionally Hawiye and Rahanweyn clan-dominated areas mainly in Southern Somalia.174 The close 
connection between members of a group based on a tight-knit social network like the clan and sub-clan 
should not be understated; the bonds had existed before the individuals choose to engage in terrorism. 
Thus, the strong bonds facilitate solidarity, commitment, and cooperation, as well as reduce 
disagreements.175 Outside Somalia, al-Shabaab urged the diasporic Somali community to fight against 
the invading forces by becoming foot soldiers, sending money or other resources. 176   
While al-Shabaab dedicated their resources to strengthen their cause and popular support, the 
group utilised terrorism to propel their cause. al-Shabaab used terrorism to demonstrate to the Somali 
government and AMISOM forces their ability to challenge their authority. The militant group was 
confident in their ability to defeat the TFG since they had defeated them before the ENDF came to the 
government’s defence in 2006. As figure 1 demonstrates, al-Shabaab predominantly targeted 
military/police,177 and government-related posts,178 like a traditional insurgency. As illustrated in figure 
2, 45 percent of the fatalities recorded by GTD was a result of al-Shabaab attacks against those targets. 
The worst attack came in October 2008 when they coordinated car bombings in Somaliland and 
Puntland targeting the Ethiopian Consulate, UNDP and the Presidential palace in Somaliland. This 
devastating attack resulted in the death of more than 30 people.179 Although AMISOM was not the 
initial target during this phase, they suffered casualties including attacks at the AMISOM’s headquarter 
in Mogadishu and an AMISOM-contracted supply company that killed 20 people.180 Regardless of the 
fact that al-Shabaab mainly targeted traditionally-insurgent targets, most of the casualties were civilians.   
al-Shabaab also used terrorism to advertise their cause to the public by demonstrating illustrate 
their ability to potentially defeat the AMISOM-backed TFG. During the first phase, al-Shabaab’s attack 
on soft targets resulted in few casualties unless government officials are present. One of these instances 
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occurred at medical school graduation ceremony in Mogadishu where a suicide bomber killed three 
cabinet ministers and sixteen civilians.181 
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Other   53 104 12 169  45 18 4 67 
Grand Total 35 112 204 37 424 40 110 385 39d 574 
Figure 2: Sum of casualties due to al-Shabaab attacks during phase one  
(Source: Global Terrorism Database) 
 
4.3.2: Phase two (11 July 2010 – May 2012)   
4.3.2.1: Lessons from phase one and the change in AMISOM’s structure and strategy in phase 
two 
The second phase of AMISOM begun after the devastating twin bombings by al-Shabaab in 
Kampala on 11th July 2010. This attack, which was the group’s first major attack outside Somalia, 182 
resulted in the deaths of 76 people. This attack came two days after Godane issued a fatwa, or religious 
edict, declaring jihad against TCCs.183 The twin bombings forced AMISOM to re-strategise their plan 
in Somalia. It became evident at the beginning of this phase that al-Shabaab's capability to conduct 
lethal attacks had increased significantly during the first phase. For this reason, AMISOM’s strategy to 
defeat al-Shabaab relied on increased military offensives aimed at “liberation of cities”, decapitation 
and increased troop strength. To implement this formula, AMISOM, with approval from the UNSC, 
became a peace enforcement mission with the right to carry out military operations.184 
 
4.3.2.2: Liberation of cities 
A major part of the AMISOM’s formula to reduce the threat of al-Shabaab revolved around the 
“liberation of cities.” By this time al-Shabaab controlled most of the major cities and towns in southern 
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Somalia including Mogadishu, Marka, Baidoa and Kismayo. The importance of cities in conflict should 
not be underestimated; cities are symbolic and have leverage value. Cities, especially the capital city, 
are centres of political, military and economic powers.185 This means whoever controls the capital city 
and other major cities in the country have access to critical infrastructures such as roads, electrical grid, 
telecommunications and transportation services, resources, and military and police protection.186 Due 
to this, public goods and services originate from cities then transmitted to towns and villages. In other 
words, cities are symbols of national development, a reminder of the progress of the State.187 This is 
especially the case in African countries where, due to colonialism, the capital city and few other cities 
were developed, therefore becoming the ultimate identity of the State. The rest of the country, by 
independence, was largely inaccessible hinterlands.188  
For the reasons mentioned above, it was indicative for AMISOM to retake the capital city of 
Mogadishu and other major cities from al-Shabaab. The loss of cities to nonstate actors is one of the 
best indicators of state illegitimacy. al-Shabaab as a threat to state legitimacy and sovereignty differed 
from the past experiences. After the fall of Said Barre regime in 1991, factions and warlords controlled 
territory but it was mostly within clan and sub-clan context. al-Shabaab’s ability to transcend clan and 
sub-clan identities allowed the group to control more territory than the transitional government. 
Additionally, most of the territory that the militant group acquired was done through negotiations rather 
than conquest. This is extremely problematic as it illustrates TFG’s lack of legitimacy in Somalia; the 
clans and sub-clans preferred to be governed by al-Shabaab rather than the Somali government.189 
Putzel and Di John explain the absence of state function over time can easily result in the creation of 
alternative government(s) that possess “powerful sources of legitimacy to mobilise people in the violent 
struggle against the state.”190 In the case of Somalia, al-Shabaab, within the first phase, was able to gain 
a greater domestic legitimacy, demonstrated by their ability to spread their authority throughout 
Southern Somalia in a short time, than the TFG, who mostly enjoyed international legitimacy, and 
mobilise people in a violent insurgency. Therefore, without full control over territory, the Somali 
government cannot entirely or effectively police and control its borders.       
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4.3.2.3: Decapitation    
The second element of AMISOM’s new strategy is the use of decapitation, the cornerstone of 
the counterterrorism strategy, to eliminate the threat of al-Shabaab in Somalia and the neighbouring 
region. As stated earlier, decapitation is the arresting and/or killing of leaders and the top echelon of 
terrorist and insurgent groups. As stated in a previous sub-section, the US military had conducted 
airstrikes and raids that resulted in the deaths of top leaders including Aden Hashi Ayro. AMISOM 
hoped that during the second phase, they would acquire the military equipment that would ensure that 
their troops could conduct their own decapitation policy.191 
The presumed success of the decapitation strategy rests on four basic assumptions. One, the 
approach assumes that the main leader and the top echelon of the group are essential to the progress of 
the group, i.e. the charismatic leadership argument.192 Secondly, the strategy assumes that the leaders 
and top echelon are the most skilled members, therefore, hard to replace compared to foot soldiers. 
Thirdly, this policy implies the capture of the leader and top echelon will provide the government with 
valuable information that would prevent future attacks or can be admissible in court cases.193 Finally, 
the policy assumes that decapitation has the potential of swaying members and sympathisers to rethink 
their involvement in terrorism.194     
  
4.3.2.4: CT and COIN operations during the second phase 
With the mandate change, AMISOM desired to increase its troop strength to implement the 
new strategy. To be able to conduct both offensive and defensive military operations, AMISOM needed 
to increase the troop strength. As stated previously, AMISOM was operating with only 65% of the 
needed 8000 troops at the end of phase one. Once AMISOM reached 8000 troop strength by the end of 
2010, a UN-approved resolution urged TCCs to donate 12,000 additional troops to reach the desired 
strength of 20,000. The new resolution called for ground, air and maritime troops and an increase of 
personnel in the civilian and police components.195 
The primary objective of this phase was the “liberation” of Mogadishu from al-Shabaab and 
other insurgent and terrorist groups. The Battle of Mogadishu happened in two stages. The 2010 Battle 
of Mogadishu offensive ended in a military stalemate as AMISOM and SAF troops were unable to 
retake any neighbourhood from al-Shabaab or any other militias, who at this point were controlling 9 
                                                          
      191 ‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia Dated 13 September 2011’ 
(Addis Ababa: Peace and Security Council, 13 September 2011). 
     192 The best example of decapitation working after charismatic leadership were arrested or killed is Shining 
Path and Aum Shinrikyo. For more information about charismatic leadership argument of decapitation, refer to  
Jenna Jordan, ‘When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation’, 722–28.   
     193 Jones and Libiscki, ‘How Terrorist Groups End’, 61. 
     194 Jones and Libiscki, 25. 
     195 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia Dated 30 December 2010’ (New York: United Nations 
Security Council, 30 December 2010), 11. 
 
43 | P a g e  
 
out of 16 districts in Mogadishu.196 Following the disastrous operation, AMISOM troops attempted to 
recapture all the districts in final Battle for Mogadishu in 2011. By the time the new operation 
commenced, Djibouti had rehatted most of its forces as AMISOM troops. The increased troop strength 
proved to be beneficial197 as the operation retook Wadnaha Road,198 the symbolic Red Mosque, the 
Damanyo military camp, the former Italian Embassy, and the former Interior Ministry building.199 By 
the end of the operation, TFG claimed to be in control of 13 out of the 16 districts in Mogadishu. The 
government was able to control many districts since al-Shabaab vacated from the districts they 
controlled without any confrontation 200 and moved its operations to Lower Jubbaland, near the Kenyan 
border.201    
Three months after claiming that Mogadishu had been liberated, KDF, who had not officially 
joined AMISOM, conducted Operation Linda Nchi, which translates to operation Defend the Nation, 
in Southern Somalia.202 The Kenyan government claimed that it was necessary to perform such 
operations since al-Shabaab posed a threat to its sovereignty as the group sustained small-scale attacks 
along the border towns of Mandera and Garissa which resulted in deaths of tens of Kenyans and the 
kidnapping of Kenyan and foreign nationals.203 Two days after the operation began, the representatives 
of the two governments signed a letter of understanding detailing Kenya’s ‘remedial and pre-emptive 
actions’ against al-Shabaab and TFG’s support of the efforts.204 The primary purpose of this operation 
was to create a 100 kilometres buffer zone deep inside the Jubbaland administration.205 The joint 
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operations with KDF, SAF and AMISOM troops resulted in the recapture of major towns in Southern 
Somalia such as Afgoye, Baidoa, Ras Kamboni, and Afmadow.206   
 Although AMISOM had emphasised the importance of decapitation in their strategy, both 
the coalition forces could not prioritise CT operations. In AMISOM’s defence, the TCCs, until the 
incorporation of KDF and ENDF in the third phase, did not possess the necessary military equipment 
to conduct aerial airstrikes. Therefore, the coalition forces relied on the US military to conduct most of 
the operations. Regardless, their combined efforts contributed to the death of al-Qaida leader in East 
Africa and a senior al-Shabaab commander, Fazul Abdallah Mohammed.207 Additionally, two senior 
al-Shabaab operatives, Ali Hassan Gheddi and Mohamed Faruq, defected to Somali troops. 208 Also 
regarding counterterrorism, AMISOM police component, with the support of the Angolan Government, 
trained Somali police in criminal investigations, community policing, airport security, and 
counterterrorism procedures.209 Moreover, AMISOM and SAF troops partook in IED-diffusion training 
which, in one year, reduced the casualties by 90 percent.210   
 
4.3.2.5: Al-Shabaab’s response to the CT and COIN operations during the second phase 
During the second phase, al-Shabaab increased the number and lethality of attacks. As Figure 
3 illustrates, approximately 47 percent of all attacks were due to attacks on military, police and 
government posts. In fact, 76 percent of all fatalities were a result of those attacks. The attacks included 
a suicide car bombing on a government security base in Mogadishu resulted in the death of at least 19 
police officers,211 and suicide bombing on an Ethiopian military base in Beledweyne.212 Similar to the 
first phase, although the militant group targeted traditional insurgent targets, most of the casualties were 
civilian, with the worst incident occurring after a truck bombing outside the education ministry building 
killing 70+ students.213 Al-Shabaab tripled the number of attacks on private citizens and property posts 
compared during the first phase.214 The most deadly attack came as a result of a combined armed assault 
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and bombing attack at the Muna hotel in Mogadishu, a hotel visited by top government and foreign 
nationals, that resulted in the deaths of six MPs and twenty-four civilians.215   
 
Figure 3: Number of attacks by al-Shabaab during phase two 
(Source: Global Terrorism Database) 
 
In addition to maintaining their terror campaign,  al-Shabaab actively sought to expand its 
influence both inside and outside the Somali borders by creating formal alliances with like-minded 
groups. On 10 January 2012, a formal agreement was established between the group and Al-Hijra or 
Muslim Youth Centre in Mombasa. Godane appointed Ahmed Iman Ali as the Emir of al-Shabaab in 
Kenya.216 Almost a month later, al-Shabaab formally became an al-Qaida affiliate group on 9th February 
2012. 217 Also in February, al-Shabaab strengthened its alliances with militias in semi-autonomous 
region, Puntland, with Yaasiin Khalid Osman as Emir of Golis Mountain.218     
By the end of the final Battle for Mogadishu, al-Shabaab saw a need to re-evaluate their strategy 
against the Somali government and their allies. Direct confrontation with AMISOM troops proved too 
deadly for the militant group as they were militarily inferior.  Defeating TFG in 2006 before the ENDF 
came to their rescue and the stalemate during the first Battle of Mogadishu in 2010 gave the insurgents 
the belief that they could defeat the coalition forces. AMISOM’s ability to successfully retake most of 
the districts in the capital city during the first quarter of 2011 confirmed to al-Shabaab their inferiority. 
For this reason, al-Shabaab began fighting a guerrilla war rather than a conventional war.219 As a war 
for the weak, guerilla warfare was a best-suited strategy for the insurgents as it provides the best way 
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to use their limited resources to inflict maximum damages.220 Ultimately, a guerrilla war is a war of 
attrition that forces the state to engage in a lengthy and costly war, especially if the insurgents continue 
to gain legitimacy.221      
Additionally, by the end of the second phase, al-Shabaab needed to do a cost-benefit analysis 
to determine their willingness to control cities and towns. The militant group understood the cost of 
controlling territory. The importance of cities, as discussed in a previous sub-section, guaranteed 
AMISOM and SAF’s desire to ‘liberate’ cities and towns from al-Shabaab. Although the case, al-
Shabaab recognized the benefit of maintaining territorial sovereignty. For one, like the state, they 
benefit from the critical infrastructure in cities. Also, their ability to capture major cities demonstrates 
their strength to local and international audiences. Martin Shaw affirms that the capture of a capital city 
“remains the ultimate symbol of conquest and national survival.”222 In other words, the capture of the 
capital city is a prize of significance due to the implication of and access to resources.223  By the end of 
the final Battle for Mogadishu al-Shabaab made the tactical decision to relinquish their territorial grip 
when directly confronted by AMISOM troops. This meant that the militant group would continue to 
expand its territorial gains, but would retreat when confronted directly by AMSIOM troops, as they did 
during the last few weeks of the final Battle of Mogadishu.  As they retreat, al-Shabaab would continue 
to conduct hit and run attacks aimed at stopping AMISOM’s advances.  
 
4.3.3: Phase three (June 2012 – December 2016)    
4.3.3.1: Lessons from phase two and the changes in AMISOM’s structure and strategy in phase 
three 
The success of the final Battle for Mogadishu and the liberation of other major cities in Southern 
Somalia during the second phase gave AMISOM the much-needed confidence that their COIN and CT 
operations have had a positive impact on Somalia. As a result, AMISOM began the third phase without 
re-evaluating their strategies. From their viewpoint, the increased troop strength due to the rehatted 
Djiboutian troops and deployment of additional Burundian and Ugandan troops, the sustained COIN 
and CT operations, and the additional pressure from KDF unilateral efforts led the achievement of 
AMISOM’s stated objectives during the second phase. AMISOM interpreted the “liberation” of 
Mogadishu, al-Shabaab’s most prized possession, as the beginning of the decline of the group. The 
troops’ morale increased when KDF officially joined the coalition forces at the beginning of the third 
                                                          
    220 ‘Field Manual: Counterinsurgency Operations’, 1–9. 
    221 Jones and Johnston, ‘The Future of Insurgency’, 5. 
    222 Martin Shaw, ‘New Wars of the City: Relationships of “Urbicide” and “Genocide”’, in Cities, War, and 
Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 280. 
    223 M. Llandau-Wells, ‘Capital Cities in Civil Wars: The Locational Dimension of Sovereign Authority’ 
(London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008), 13. 
 
47 | P a g e  
 
phase. The integration of the KDF troops increased the troop strength to 17,709,224  which was short of 
their 20,000-target.225 
The objectives of the current phase reflected AMISOM’s optimism and high morale. The main 
purpose of the current phase is the “liberation of cities and towns” that provide revenue to the militant 
group, i.e. port cities used for selling charcoal, sugar and other contraband.226 The coalition forces 
believed that the CT and COIN operations would result in the defeat of al-Shabaab by the end of 2015. 
This benchmark was placed as a precursor to the first universal election in Somalia since 1969, 
scheduled for November 2016.227 After the elections, AMISOM would assist with the consolidation 
process that would fully reinstate the FSG’s power throughout Somalia. Following the five-years 
consolidation process, AMISOM would withdraw all its apparatuses in the country by the end of 
2020.228 
 
4.3.3.2: CT and COIN operations during the third phase  
The first operation during the current phase was Operation Sledgehammer which sought to 
retake the port city of Kismayo, an al-Shabaab's stronghold suspected to be the primary source of 
revenue. To ensure the success of the operation, the ENDF briefly rejoined the conflict with an attempt 
to force the militant group to fight on multiple fronts. Since Kismayo is believed to be a major source 
of revenue, AMISOM expected al-Shabaab to fight ferociously to protect the city. Three days after the 
battle begun on September 28th, 2012, al-Shabaab militants retreated from the city. This tactical decision 
by al-Shabaab allowed AMISOM to claim victory.229 After the completion of the operation, Burundi 
deployed troops to areas captured by ENDF since they once again withdrew troops to the to Ethiopian-
Somali border.230 Unfortunately, the Burundian force could not hold all ENDF-occupied territory 
resulting in al-Shabaab recapturing Hudur town.231 
Rather than engaging in offensive CT and COIN operations after retaking Kismayo from al-
Shabaab, AMISOM focused on defensive COIN operations in 2013. These operations, which included 
daily raids and patrols, aimed to clear and secure all ‘liberated’ cities and towns of remnants of al-
Shabaab. Also, the troops worked to reinstate the authority of the TFG, which had transformed into 
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FGS on 20th August 2012, in the newly acquired territory by mediating talks with clans and sub-clans.232 
Although the forces did not conduct major offensives, AMISOM captured Jawhar233 and secured the 
last stretch of the main road from Mogadishu to Baidoa.234     
The US military and KDF intensified their counterterrorism efforts in the last quarter of the 
2013 and beginning of 2014. A mission to kill or capture Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir,235 in 
Baraawe, an al-Shabaab stronghold, failed as al-Shabaab reinforcement fought vigorously against the 
US Navy seals causing them to retreat.236 Later in the month, KDF forces conducted an aerial attack on 
al-Shabaab training camps in southern Somalia.237 The US carried out another drone strike killing three 
senior al-Shabaab commanders including the top explosives expert, Ibrahim Ali Abdi.238 On January 
26, 2014, an airstrike resulted in the death of Sahal Iskudhuq, a high-ranking al-Shabaab Amniyat or 
intelligence commander.239      
The increased AMISOM troop strength from the rehatted ENDF troops in January 2014 
expedited the advancement of operations in Southern Somalia where al-Shabaab still enjoyed the 
freedom of movement. The increased troop strength assisted AMISOM to reach almost full capacity 
with 22,026 out of the 22,126-requested troops available for missions.240 ENDF’s first mission as part 
of AMISOM was the 20-day Operation Eagle, which began on 3rd March, which retook eight of the 
desired ten districts the Galguduud and Hiraan regions in Central Somalia including Xudur, and Ceel 
Buur.241 Operation Indian Ocean, which began the end of August, aimed to “seise, secure and stabilise 
key districts along the coastline in all sectors.” Within the two-month operation, AMISOM claimed to 
have captured Baraawe, a major al-Shabaab stronghold, and Jalalaqsi and secured the Beletweyne-Bulo 
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Burto road which al-Shabaab had closed off to aid relief trucks.242 AMISOM launched Operation Ocean 
Build in November designed to “enhancing stabilisation by holding key population centres and 
protecting their inhabitants and movements along the main supply routes.”243 The seven-month 
operation resulted in the recapture of Kudhaa Island, with the support of the Interim Jubba 
Administration (IJA), from al-Shabaab.244 
AMISOM and US military viewed their decapitation efforts during the last quarter of 2014 as 
successful. The group’s Emir, Godane, was killed in a US airstrike in Baraawe on 1st September during 
Operation Indian Ocean. Sheikh Ahmad Abu Ubeyda was subsequently named the new leader.245  
Operation Ocean Build resulted in the deaths of Intelligence Chief Tahilil Abdishakur,246 Chief of 
External Operations Tahlil Yusuf Dheeq,247 and Dheeq’s immediate successor and mastermind of the 
Westgate mall attack, Adan Garaar.248 Zakariye Ahmed Ismail Hersi, the putative head of military 
intelligence, deflected to Somali troops, although he was able only to provide “outdated” and 
“background” information since he had been sidelined for a year before his defection.249  
Operation Juba Corridor, whose objective was to “expel al-Shabaab from its last remaining 
strongholds in south-central Somalia,”250 occurred in two stages. During the first stage, which began 
July 2015, AMISOM claimed to have “liberated” Diinsoor, the presumed al-Shabaab headquarters after 
the coalition troops retook Baraawe in October 2014 and Bardhere.251 The second stage, which resumed 
in January 2016, resulted in the capture of towns such as Adan Yabal and Galcud.252 AMISOM defended 
the city of Afgoye from an al-Shabaab-attempted takeover in which two senior AMISOM military 
officials were killed.253   
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While AMISOM actively sought to retake territory from al-Shabaab, 2016 saw an astounding 
twist in which the troops vacated from some cities and towns, claiming tactical reasons. AMISOM 
vacated from its bases in Badhaadhe, and Bulo Guduud in January,254 Garas Weyne in July, 255 Ceel 
Cali and Tayeeglow in September and October.256 Al-Shabaab immediately took control of the towns 
after AMISOM troops left. Due to lack of payment of salaries, SAF evacuated from the port city of 
Marka, but AMISOM ensured that al-Shabaab did not retake the city.257  
AMISOM and the US military continued to pursue decapitation as the driving force of their 
counterterrorism strategy in 2016. Hassan Ali Dhoore,258 Mohamud Dulyadeyn, and Maalim Daud were 
killed.259 In a night-time raid in one of the training camps, the US and Somali commandos captured an 
undisclosed number of high-value al-Shabaab militants.260 Somali Special Forces (SSF) raided a 
suspected hideout in Central Somalia where senior al-Shabaab members were killed.261 US airstrikes 
targeted al-Shabaab’s Rasao training camp in Hiraan region,262 and another camp near Kismayo,263 
where hundreds of foot-soldiers and some senior commanders were apparently killed.264 
 
4.3.3.3: al-Shabaab’s response to CT and COIN operations during the third phase    
The third and current phase of AMISOM is al-Shabaab’s most dangerous phase. This 
phenomenon is noted in Figure 4 where each year has become more violent than before. Between June 
2012 and December 2016, the extremist group increased the number and lethality of the attacks.  Figure 
5 shows al-Shabaab continued to target mainly classical insurgent targets with approximately 87 percent 
of all attacks during this phase targeted government, military and police posts. The attacks resulted in 
the deaths of top government officials including Chief of the Somali Counterterrorism Unit of the 
National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA),265 Deputy Mayor of Mogadishu, Somali 
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Ambassador to Switzerland, and Somali Permanent Representative to the UN office in Geneva.266 
Similar to previous phases, most of the 5000 deaths were civilians.   
 
Figure 4: A graph illustrating the rise in the lethality of attacks by al-Shabaab (2007-2016) 
(Source: Global Terrorism Database)  
 
 
Figure 5: Number of attacks by al-Shabaab during phase three 
(Source: Global Terrorism Database) 
 
After al-Shabaab relinquished their control of Mogadishu in mid-2011, reports of infighting 
among the top echelon of the group began to merge. The first reported instance of infighting came as a 
result of the change of tactics that led to al-Shabaab vacating from Mogadishu. Within weeks of 
announcing changes, Mukhtar Robow, one of the original co-founders of al-Shabaab, believed that the 
fighters should not retreat from combat too quickly.267 Other leaders thought the withdrawal of its troops 
from Mogadishu was a telling of Godane’s leadership. Robow and Ibrahim al-Afghani’s, another co-
founder of al-Shabaab, were replaced by Mahad Warsame Qaley Karatey, a staunch loyalist, in the top 
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Shura after they voiced their concerns about the new tactical changes. In addition to this change, he 
suspended top Shura meetings indefinitely.268  
The second cited an instance of infighting came as a result of the rise in civilian casualties, 
especially during the Ramadan offensive, the group’s response to Battle of Mogadishu in the second 
phase. The first criticism came from Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, a senior al-Qaida and al-Shabaab 
leader, who opposed shedding the blood of innocent Muslims, as a result of targeting soft targets.269 A 
year later, Omar Hammami, the senior American commander known for his propaganda videos, echoed 
Robow and Fazul Mohammed’s earlier concerns of unnecessary killing of civilians. His stance against 
Godane’s tactics, as well against his strict Sharia interpretation and marginalisation of foreign fighters, 
led to his death in 2013.270  
Infighting became a major concern that Ibrahim al-Afghani voiced his frustrations with the 
Godane’s leadership in a letter to Ayman al-Zawahiri, then second-in-command of al-Qaida, where he 
asked for help. In the letter, he asked for the appointment of a new leader. Godane responded to the 
increased criticism with an open letter claiming that the opposition, who were attempting to create new 
factions, was making false claims. He also accused the opposition of sharing group secrets with enemies 
of Islam and shedding blood of innocent Muslims. Three days after he issued the open letter, al-Afghani, 
like Hammami, was killed by militants loyal to Godane.271 The death of al-Afghani caused further 
division between Godane and Robow.272 Without a doubt, infighting among the top echelon of al-
Shabaab is a sign of weakness in the group. It is yet unclear the extent of the impact of the infighting 
on the group’s operations.  
 
4.3.3.4: Analysis of the third phase    
Although the current phase is not finished, thus far, the third phase has demonstrated 
AMISOM’s strategy and formula in Somalia has not achieved the intended objectives. This phase has 
further confirmed that increased CT and COIN operations and troop strength do not necessarily equate 
to defeat of al-Shabaab or their capacity to conduct attacks. UN officials have also voiced their 
dissatisfaction with the progress of the mission. Téte Antonio, the Permanent Observer of the AU to the 
UN, observed that despite AMISOM’s gains, the militant group had demonstrated their “resilience and 
the capacity to adapt…[and] gather intelligence.” He adds that the militant group’s use of highly mobile 
units to conduct ‘complex attacks’ has successfully impeded AMISOM’s efforts.273 
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This current phase illustrates the need for AMISOM to re-evaluate their implementation of 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy. Their efforts have not reduced the threat of al-
Shabaab nor have they achieved the majority of the intended objectives. This study argues that the three 
principal problems with the implementation of AMISOM’s current formula are: 1) the execution of the 
Clear, Hold and Build operations, 2) the use of decapitation, and 3) the over-militarization of the 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. AMISOM must recognise the need for a holistic 
COIN and CT approaches that find a balance between military, political and economic solutions. 
Additionally, the coalition forces must strive to provide security in Somalia so that Clear, Hold and 
Build phases of COIN operations can be conducted efficiently.   
 
4.3.3.3.1: The implementation of “Clear, Hold and Build” operations  
                This dissertation argues that AMISOM’s inability to reduce the threat of al-Shabaab lies in 
the implementation of “Clear, Hold and Build” operations. As discussed earlier, a “clear” operation is 
intended to remove all remnants of insurgent activities in a city. This is then followed by “hold and 
build” operations that aim to ensure that the territory is not reclaimed by the insurgents while building 
structures associated with governance and development. The focal point of AMISOM’s COIN 
operations is the “liberation of cities”, which, in its essence, is a clearing operation. The coalition forces 
simplistically define “liberation of cities” as the dispersing of al-Shabaab fighters during operations. 
This basic understanding of clearing operations is called into question. For one, AMISOM’s 
understanding of the “liberation of cities” assumes that military offensives are the sole or predominant 
reason that AMISOM  has recaptured cities and towns in southern Somalia.  As stated in previous sub-
sections, al-Shabaab made the tactical decision during the second phase to relinquish territorial gains 
when directly confronted by AMISOM troops. This tactical change is verified by UN Monitoring Group 
reports where they claim that in most of the cases in which AMISOM has claimed to have scattered 
militant fighters,  al-Shabaab tactically retreated instead of engaging directly with the troops.274 
Secondly, AMISOM’s claim of the “liberation of cities” is challenged by the frequency of attacks in 
those cities, which will be in-depth later in the study.  For a clearing operation to be considered 
successful, remnants of the insurgent activity should not be as high as it is in the Somali case. 
AMISOM’s oversimplification of the understanding of what clearing operations entail 
underestimates the significance of the use of terrorism in an urban setting by al-Shabaab. As stated 
earlier, as a result of the military offensives in the second phase, the militant group tactically chose to 
vacate from cities and town rather than directly engage with AMISOM troops due to their military 
might. This tactical decision is surprising since a critical element of an insurgent group, which 
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differentiates it from a terrorist group, is that they seek to control territory. Although the case, the use 
of terrorism by insurgent groups such as al-Shabaab in cities is as significant and powerful as capturing 
the city itself. Stephen Graham explains cities have “long actually themselves been the explicit target 
for a wide range of deliberate, orchestrated, attacks” due to their political, economic and cultural 
importance.275 Jo Beall adds, the attraction of attacking cities lies in the vulnerability of soft targets 
which are harder to defend compared to government and military posts.276 She continues to say the that 
“degree of visibility” and the potential for “maximum impact” of devastating attacks encourages 
modern-day terrorists and insurgents to carry out attacks in cities. Such attacks guarantee media 
attention from both local and international sources.277 As stated in the literature review, terrorism is a 
communication tool in which insurgents and terrorists use to get media attention. The media attention, 
which brings light to their cause, has the potential to attract new members and sympathisers. Therefore, 
attacks on soft targets is a suitable tactic since it will get media attention and provoke a heavy-handed 
response by the government which delegitimises them, like capturing a city. Furthermore, targeting soft 
targets in cities further taunts the government because the attacks spread fear and chaos in their city 
which calls into question the government’s ability to perform its primary task of the protection of its 
citizens. Timothy Luke concludes that “it takes very little to terrorise a city, a region and even an entire 
nation; with the right technology, you can scare many people.”278   
The current phase of AMISOM exemplifies al-Shabaab’s reliance on terrorism, especially in 
recently ‘liberated cities and towns,’ is used to delegitimise the Somali government and AMISOM. The 
Somali extremist group is capitalising on fear and chaos to promulgate their cause. Although the use of 
fear to achieve a political cause is associated with terrorist groups, as described in the literature review, 
insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Iraq are capitalising on this tactic. Kilcullen observes that some 
insurgent groups in Iraq and Afghanistan who use terrorism to spread fear are not interested in 
governing or gaining control but rather to paralyse and fragment the state.279  The overuse of terrorism 
by insurgent groups today is becoming a contributing factor to the ambiguities between terrorism and 
insurgency.  
 al-Shabaab’s delegitimising terror campaign focuses on increasing the number and lethality of 
attack in towns and cities that AMISOM claims to be “liberated.” In this phase alone, 43.8% of the 
attacks (859 attacks) during this phase were concentrated in four key cities (Mogadishu, Baidoa, Marka 
and Kismayo) that AMISOM claim to be ‘liberated.’ As stated throughout this chapter, al-Shabaab has 
continued to mainly target military, police and government posts, like with traditional insurgencies. 
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Their most lethal attacks during this phase have been on soft targets, although the primary target was 
still locations frequented by military and government officials.280 These attacks include restaurant 
bombing in Beledweyne in which 13 soldiers and civilians were killed,281  Jazeera Palace and Sahafi 
Hotel bombing that killed at least 15 people,282 and Somali Youth League hotel and peace garden and 
Lido beach bombings where Abdullah Hussein Mohamud, a recently elected MP,283 Mohamed Hamza, 
Minister for Environment,284 are among the politicians killed.285 Regardless, civilians bare the majority 
of the casualties. 
AMISOM must refocus their strategy to counter the chaos and fear that al-Shabaab’s terror 
campaigns have brought to Somalia. David Ucko argues that insecurity makes it impossible and 
politically meaningless to pursue governance, development and other ‘build’ activities,286 which is the 
case in Somalia. From the beginning of the mission until today, AMISOM struggled to effectively 
spread the authority of the FGS to all corners of Somalia when insecurity is still a major problem in the 
country. Kilcullen explains that providing security is one of the three pillars of counterinsurgency and 
counterinsurgents must protect the population from attacks or intimidation from guerrillas, bandits, 
terrorists and other armed groups.287 The protection of civilians is complicated by the fact that 
insurgents, including al-Shabaab, frequently assimilate into the community in order to conduct attacks. 
This makes it difficult to fully distinguish insurgents from non-combatants when removing remnants of 
insurgency in “liberated areas.”  
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Then, it is vital for the AMISOM to move from the “realm of major combat to the realm of law 
enforcement.”288 In other words, AMISOM must improve their strategy so that they can move from the 
“realm of major combat” (clear operations) to the ‘realm of law enforcement’ (Hold operations).  As 
structures associated with law enforcement is re-established, AMISOM and the FGS must “consolidate 
the control [established during the hold phase] and then transfer the control to permanent, effective and 
legitimate institutions [established during the build phase].”289 Kilcullen advises counterinsurgent, like 
AMISOM, that their intent should not be to “reduce the violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but 
rather to return the overall system to normality.”290 Normalcy is the delivery of security to levels 
consistent with local expectation.291 In other words, AMISOM should return to its original population-
centric mandate which will assist the Somali government to address the root causes and grievances that 
have allowed groups such as al-Shabaab exist in the Somali context.    
 
4.3.3.3.2: The use of decapitation      
 As stated previously, decapitation is the basis of AMISOM’s counterterrorism strategy from 
the second phase onwards. The strategy has managed to kill top al-Shabaab leaders including the first 
and second Emirs, Ayro and Godane, and one of the masterminds behind high profile attacks in Kenya, 
Adan Garaar. As stated earlier, the UN Monitoring Group report claimed that the death of Godae is a 
major blow to the extremist group. Despite the deaths or the defection of much of the top leadership, 
al-Shabaab has continued to conduct major lethal attacks in Somalia and the neighbouring countries.  
The ineffectiveness or counterproductiveness of decapitation strategy is verified by many 
scholars. Cronin, Dongen and Jordan maintain that the killing of leaders can bring attention to the 
group’s cause which increased the likelihood of attracting sympathisers and new members. 
Additionally, this strategy increases the likelihood that a group will increase the number and lethality 
of attacks in the name of revenge or radicalisation.292 Spencer adds that use of decapitation may lead to 
the decentralisation of the group which are generally harder to counter than hierarchical groups. This 
strategy could make the group become more resilience. 293 Robert Pape believes that the use of 
decapitation on groups that frequently use suicide campaigns can temporarily disrupt their activity, but 
it will not have a long-term effect.294 Dongen and Spencer argue that the mass arrest of members might 
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be counterproductive since they can be easily replaced, especially in large organisations.295 Jordan, 
Cronin, and Dongen warn of the unintended consequences of decapitation. For one, decapitation can 
lead to the splintering of a group like in the case of Baader-Meinhof transforming to the Red Army 
Faction after the arrest and suicides of its two founders.296 Jones, Liepman and Chandler conclude that 
this strategy is not sufficient by itself to defeat most terrorist and insurgent group but should be an 
element of the broader strategy.297  Therefore, moving forward, AMISOM must re-consider whether 
they should dedicate their resources to a strategy that has been deemed ineffective or counterproductive 
by scholars. Hussien Solomon agrees, adding that the counterterrorism strategy in Somalia has proven 
to be counterproductive as it has not reduced the threat of al-Shabaab.298     
 
4.3.3.3.3: The over-militarization of CT and COIN operations  
This paper maintains that it is imperative that AMISOM re-evaluates the over-militarization of 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Although the original AMISOM mandate created 
three equal components (military, civilian and police), the military component is the biggest and most 
utilised. The most logical assumption for the prevalence of the military strategy is that the guiding 
hypothesis is that the military is the best solution or most effective solution to defeat al-Shabaab. This 
assumption is problematic since military-focused operations go against the guiding assumption of 
counterinsurgency operations which is that military alone cannot defeat the intended threat. Military-
focused COIN operations tend to enemy-centric. As stated earlier, an enemy-centric approach, seen 
used by AMISOM, focuses on the destruction of military capability and killing and arresting of 
members of a terrorist or insurgent group. Additionally, enemy-centric approach leads to the assumption 
that the strategy can eliminate terrorism as a whole which is impossible; terrorism is a tactic that cannot 
be eradicated.299 Statistically, military-focused operations do not have a high success rate. Jones and 
Libiscki’s research concludes that military force does not have a high rate of success. In fact, the strategy 
has a seven-percent and twenty-five percent success rate against terrorist and insurgent groups 
respectively.300 Collin et al. concur with the study adding, insurgents have a higher chance of prevailing 
when pursued with an “iron fist” or enemy-centric approach rather than a motive-focused or a 
population-centric approach.301   
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As stated earlier, AMISOM was intended to be a population-centric multidimensional force 
balanced by three equal components, military, police, and civilian.  As demonstrated in the previous 
sub-sections, the police and civilian components are still in their infancy stages, ten years later. They 
remain understaffed and underrepresented in the mission. In fact,  AMISOM claims to have delayed the 
deployment of the police component to Mogadishu due to insecurity yet the military component had 
been operating in the capital city from the very beginning.302  This example shows that the AMISOM’s 
priority was the military over the other elements. Additionally, AMISOM reports stress the need to 
increase the military troop strength but not on the deployment of police officers and civilian personnel. 
Regarding the civilian component, the specifics regarding what the component is involved in still 
uncertain. An AMISOM report states that “there is little done to track and assess the contribution of the 
civilian component of mission goals.”303 
The concerns over the over-militarisation of AMISOM is addressed in a report detailing the 
lessons learnt in the past decade.304 The report argues that the over-militarisation of AMISOM is a result 
of a lack of understanding and limited guidance on the multidimensional nature of the mission. 
AMISOM acknowledges the need to improve the military-police-civilian partnership.305  This report 
exemplifies that the AMISOM does not regularly reflect on and evaluate the progress of the mission. 
The lack of evaluation and the modifying the strategy is critical to the growth of both COIN and CT 
operations, as this paper argues.  Paul et al.’s research conclude that COIN operations that fail to adapt 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion  
2017 marked the ten-year anniversary of the deployment of AMISOM troops to Somalia. As 
stated in the original mandate, the mission aimed to reduce the threat of insurgent and terrorist groups 
in the country who made it impossible for the TFG to operate. The mission was deemed important since 
past efforts, which began after the fall of Said Barre regime in 1991, to create a strong federal 
government had failed. At the inception of the mission in 2007, al-Shabaab had not gained the military 
significance it has today. To stop the rapid growth of al-Shabaab, a mandate change at the beginning of 
the second phase allowed AMSIOM troops to conduct offensive CT and COIN operations. Before this, 
the coalition forces carried out defensive measures such as protection of key installations and 
government officials. The military offensives aimed to “liberate cities and towns” from al-Shabaab and 
decapitate or kill or capture top leadership.      
Throughout the ten-year mission, AMISOM officials, TCCS and donor countries praise 
AMISOM troop successes in Somalia. The main objective of this study was to challenge the notion of 
success described in many official reports and communiques from the AU and UN. Although the reports 
to do not specifically detail how they measure AMISOM’s success, an analysis of such reports indicate 
that the AU and UN use the body-count approach to determine the success rate of CT and COIN 
operations. The body-count approach calls for the statistical analysis of CT indicators (number of 
incidents and casualties suffered, plots foiled, destruction of safe havens and training camps, leaders 
and members killed or arrested, disruption of recruitment flow or the amount of terrorist funding seised) 
and COIN indicators (territorial gains). Some scholars have indicated that this approach is used alone 
as it is done by the AU and UN, does not accurately reflect the success or failure of counterterrorism 
and counterinsurgency operations.  
Therefore, this dissertation aimed to fill the knowledge gap regarding the evaluation and 
analysis of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies in the African continent by analysing 
AMISOM’s ability to reduce the threat of al-Shabaab. This paper uses the contextualization of the body-
count approach to analysing the CT and COIN operations. This approach calls for the factoring of 
operations and tactics employed by both the counterinsurgents and the threat (insurgents or terrorists) 
as reasoning for the decrease or increase of numbers. Body-count approach does not account for the 
actions of terrorists or insurgents as factors that contribute to the decrease or increase in numbers. As 
the paper has demonstrated, the conceptualisation of the body-count approach is the best approach to 
determine the factors that have contributed to the limited success by AMISOM in Somalia.  
This dissertation asserts that by the time AMSIOM evaluated their strategy and changed their 
mandate to allow for military CT and COIN operations at the beginning of the second phase, al-Shabaab 
had made significant progress to solidify their presence in Somalia. During the first phase when 
AMISOM was considered a peace-support mission, the militant group became a fully-fledged insurgent 
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organisation equipped with a mighty cause that incorporated the anti-Ethiopian sentiment, which was 
prevalent in Somalia prior to the deployment of AMISOM troops, and radical Islamic thought. 
Additionally, the militants made significant territorial gains which were either captured through 
conquest or negotiations with clans and sub-clans. In other words, this paper argues that the weak 
mandate and inadequate troop strength during the first phase provided the necessary environment for 
al-Shabaab to thrive in the organisation it is today. 
With the ability to conduct military operations at the beginning of the second phase, AMISOM 
strategy emphasised the “liberation of cities and towns”, the cornerstone of their COIN operations, and 
decapitation, the cornerstone of their CT operations.  By the end of this phase, AMSIOM claimed to 
have “liberated” Mogadishu and other smaller cities and towns. A major mistake that AMISOM made 
going into the third phase was not realising the tactical changes made by al-Shabaab. The intense 
military pressure during the second phase forced the militant group to move away from direct 
confrontation with AMISOM troops to waging a guerrilla war. A major element of this new strategy 
called for the relinquishing of territorial gains when confronted by AMISOM. The implementation of 
this strategy was seen during the last few weeks of the final Battle for Mogadishu in 2011 when al-
Shabaab fighters retreated from battles. Instead of controlling cities and towns, the extremist group 
focused on increasing the number and lethality of attacks. The intensified terror campaign allowed the 
group to continue to cause havoc and chaos in the newly “liberated cities and towns” without dedicating 
their limited resources to defend the city from AMISOM troops. The use of terrorism used by al-
Shabaab after retreating from Mogadishu in 2011 is similar to how terrorist organisations operate. The 
change in the use of terrorism is not unique to the Somali extremist organisation but has been seen in 
Iraq and Afghanistan as well.  
Ten years after the deployment of the first AMISOM troops to Somalia, AMISOM needs to re-
evaluate the implementation and understanding of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. 
As discussed in the fourth chapter, AMISOM must move away from an over-militarised, enemy-centric 
CT and COIN operations to a population-centric approach that seeks to assist the FGS to address root 
causes and grievances that allow for groups such as al-Shabaab to exist. Secondly, AMISOM must re-
evaluate their conceptualisation of clearing cities of insurgent activities. As chapter four has 
demonstrated, the mere fact that al-Shabaab fighters have vacated from towns and cities does not mean 
that the city is cleared of insurgent activities. al-Shabaab made the tactical decision to increase the use 
of terrorism to supplement their inability to hold captured cities. The use of terrorism in “liberated towns 
and cities” allows al-Shabaab to; 1) spread fear and chaos, 2) illustrate the government and AMISOM’s 
inability to protect civilians from attacks and 3) their military strength. Like with most insurgencies, al-
Shabaab is incorporating strategies that will ensure their survival. The group’s inability to modify their 
formula to reflect the ever-changing conflict environment handicaps not only AMISOM’s ability to 
implement “Hold and Build” operations but also undermines the legitimacy of the FGS and AMISOM. 
Thirdly, AMISOM must re-consider the use of decapitation since, despite the deaths of many top 
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leaders, the strategy has not shown to be successful.  In conclusion, AMISOM and the Somali 
government must understand without a sense of security, it is close to impossible to sustain and 
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